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Abstract
Most rural Alaska communities are not road connected and must cope with challenging 
arctic environmental conditions. Due to their remoteness and sparse populations, these 
villages depend on isolated non-grid connected electric generation systems that operate 
on fuel oil. In Alaska, the Power Cost Equalization program is a 25 year long energy 
subsidy that targets rural residents to provide energy costs relief. A more recent state 
incentive program, the Renewable Energy Fund, was developed to expand the use of 
renewable resources and lower the cost of energy. Some rural communities have 
benefited from this program and have integrated renewable energy to their systems, 
particularly installing Wind-Diesel systems. Both programs have congruent goals of 
alleviating dependence on high cost fossil fuels to generate electricity as means to foster 
development and higher quality of life in rural Alaska communities. However, their 
incentive structure may conflict. This paper provides a review of these two energy 
subsidy policies with a particular focus on the Power Cost Equalization program and 
offers potential changes to its structure such that social cost impacts to rural residents 
are minimized while removing incentive barriers against energy efficiency and integration 
of renewable energy in rural Alaska communities.
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1Chapter 1 Power Cost Equalization
Introduction
Rural Alaska communities are remote, subject to challenging environmental conditions 
and sparsely populated. These factors make it very difficult and costly to provide basic 
services. In particular, providing energy is a unique challenge in Alaska compared to 
other locations in the country because of relatively high heating degree days, poor 
housing stock and soils that pose difficulties for construction of infrastructure. While rural 
Alaska may represent an extreme example, these issues are not unique to Alaska and 
there are no simple solutions to “...overcome the problems of high cost, remoteness and 
lack of economic base. Subsidies seem to be required to bridge the gap between high 
cost and affordable rates” (Colt, Goldsmith, & Wiita, 2003). Most rural Alaska 
communities have mixed subsistence-cash economies with limited cash employment 
available to residents. Over the years the Alaska State Legislature has established a 
number of programs to help rural residents cope with high energy prices, not only to 
provide economic relief to households but also with the intent to help support economic 
development in remote communities.
Two important electricity and energy subsidies established by the Legislature are the 
Power Cost Equalization (PCE) and the Renewable Energy Fund programs (REF).
The Power Cost Equalization program is intended to bring greater parity between 
electricity rates in rural Alaska and Alaska’s urban centers of Anchorage, Fairbanks and 
Juneau. This program has existed for almost three decades, but recently as a result of 
increased fuel and electricity prices since 2008, there is renewed interest in the PCE 
program.
As a response to historic high fossil fuel prices in 2008, the Alaska State Legislature 
created the Renewable Energy Fund program, a grant program to encourage the 
development of renewable centralized energy generation. In 2010 the Legislature set 
energy policy goals of generating 50% of Alaska’s electricity from renewable energy by 
2025 and reducing per capita electricity use by 15% by 2020.
The research presented in this monograph investigates how the currently structured 
PCE program interacts with these recently adopted goals, and by extension the REF 
program. First, I will discuss the history of the PCE program and how the program
2operates, respectively followed by a brief discussion on the history and structure of the 
REF program. Then I will describe the differences in consumption and electricity rates 
among PCE communities across various regions of Alaska. Subsequently, I will provide 
an analysis of the PCE program effects on incentives for efficiency and innovation. 
Finally, I will review alternative formula structures, how these affect the PCE program 
and resulting policy implications.
Evolution to Power Cost Equalization
After the Prudhoe Bay oil field and Trans-Alaska pipeline began operation in 1977, state 
revenues grew dramatically. High state revenues as a result of high oil prices facilitated 
the efforts to advance rural electrification. However, high fuel prices also significantly 
increased the cost of generating power in rural Alaska. Hence, the Legislature sought 
not only to expand rural electrification but also to make electricity more affordable. Some 
legislators at that time were concerned with the ability of utilities to remain solvent since 
they were facing large increases in fuel prices. Over the next few years, the Alaska State 
Legislature actively debated energy policy covering a wide span of issues form 
affordability and power availability in rural areas, to development of hydroelectric 
generating facilities and progressive goals of developing other renewable energy 
sources, as well as oil and gas policy. Many decisions during this time regarding the 
PCE program and other policies were made in the political arena and were a result of 
trade-offs negotiated as part of the legislative process. Nonetheless, here I focus on the 
history of policy decisions that gave origin to the PCE program.
The discussion first centered on a scheme called Lifeline Rate. This concept was crafted 
by the Alaska Public Interest Research Group and introduced in the 1978 legislative 
session as House Bill (HB) 937 by the House Commerce Committee. Though the bill 
had no hearings, it provided a concrete proposal to discuss how to establish an energy 
assistance program. The Lifeline Rate would provide a structure where grants would be 
made available to utilities to subsidize the equivalent of 200 (later 300 and 600) kilowatt- 
hours (kWh) per month per residential customer so that every consumer had the ability 
to consume at least a minimum amount of power; also the intention was to “shift some of 
the utilities’ cost to larger users” (State of Alaska Division of Strategic Planning, 1985).
3Concerns highlighted during this debate were that the subsidy be fixed, or have a ceiling 
in place, so that it would not fluctuate with fuel prices in order to avoid a situation in 
which the energy subsidy be “raised year after year” (State of Alaska Division of 
Strategic Planning, 1985). There were also concerns that the Lifeline Rate did not 
promote energy conservation as it would effectively provide ‘free’ energy to rural 
customers since the subsidized power provided would be 200 kWh per month when 
average consumption was thought to be about 150 kWh per month (State of Alaska 
Division of Strategic Planning, 1985). Later during the 1980 legislative session, the limit 
of the subsidized power was raised to 600 kWh through an amendment. However, the 
bill included a provision in which the program was set to end in five years which would 
allow time for the Alaska Power Authority to “have found rural diesel alternatives” (State 
of Alaska Division of Strategic Planning, 1985).
This program was supported by legislators from the rural areas or ‘bush caucus’. 
However, legislators from Anchorage voiced concerns about how ‘reasonable’ the 
subsidy was and insisted that the subsidy structure not be directly tied to fuel prices, and 
that a ceiling be in place to ensure consumers paid their “fair share” (State of Alaska 
Division of Strategic Planning, 1985). The Governor’s1 office also voiced concerns 
regarding issues of energy conservation and management challenges. In their view, if 
the subsidy was provided for delivered cost of power at the consumer level the program 
would become an “administrative nightmare” (State of Alaska Division of Strategic 
Planning, 1985).
Shortly after, between 1979 and 1980, another option surfaced for discussion and was 
called Power Production Cost Assistance (PPCA). This concept was crafted by Arthur 
Young and Company for the Dillingham Representative Nels Anderson (Matz & 
Kreinheder, 1988). These two alternatives, the Lifeline Rate and PPCA, were debated 
as ways to improve affordability of power in rural Alaska and help rural electric utilities to 
remain operational as there were concerns that “if electric rates got too high, consumers 
would simply cease to pay” (State of Alaska Division of Strategic Planning, 1985). The
1 The Governor was Jay Sterner Hammond, who advocated for environmentally and fiscally responsible 
government.
4PPCA program would financially support the utilities by paying a subsidy to cover a 
portion of their power production costs based on a sliding scale. One of its goals was to 
promote equipment efficiency without causing consumer demand to increase.
Representative Anderson introduced HB 758 which became part of the omnibus bill HCS 
SB 438. This was a major energy bill containing many important energy-related 
components including the bulk fuel program, business tax credit for energy conservation, 
and several hydroelectric amendments; it passed in 1980. This action was seen by 
critics of the PPCA program as a political move to ensure its passage, as HB 438 
included the appropriation of funds for the Susitna hydroelectric project. Governor 
Hammond voiced his objections and nearly vetoed HCS SB 438 am H because of the 
power cost assistance provision (State of Alaska Division of Strategic Planning, 1985).
He wrote to the Legislature,
The current design of this electric power subsidy program has a number of 
defects. The distribution of benefits is inequitable, inefficiencies are encouraged, 
incentives to conserve energy and search for alternatives are diminished, 
program administration is cumbersome, and total cost is uncertain. I gave serious 
thought to vetoing the bill in order to prevent the creation of a program, which I 
believe establishes a dangerous precedent. However, because of the many 
worthwhile and crucially needed elements of the bill, I feel I must accept the 
power production subsidy as well. However, I intend to submit legislation which 
will modify the subsidy design in order to reduce the problems noted above. 
(Hammond as cited in Matz & Kreinheder, 1988).
Despite the Governor’s dissent, he signed the bill and the Power Production Cost 
Assistance program was established. The purpose of the program was to have the 
State pay a portion of generation and transmission cost for utilities with high rates which 
would be used by the utilities to reduce residential rates and rates for community 
facilities and charitable organizations. About 15 utilities participated in this program 
benefiting 11,405 residential and commercial customers, 238 organizations and 473
5community facilities (Alaska PowerAuthority, 1988). The PPCA program subsidized 
about 33% (40,490 megawatt-hours) of the generated power. At that time the average 
cost of fuel per gallon for participating utilities was $1.054 or about $2.64 in 2010 dollars 
(2010$).2 However, the program only lasted one fiscal year during which it distributed 
$2,183,168 in assistance, about $5.5 million (2010$). The efforts by the Governor to re­
structure the program were defeated by legislation and “created a legislative opportunity 
to expand the program and make it permanent” (State of Alaska Division of Strategic 
Planning, 1985). Governor Hammond’s proposed changes included a subsidy of 100% 
of the price of power between $0.15 per kWh and $0.40 per kWh for no more than 200 
kWh for eligible consumers, and the program was to be terminated once the Permanent 
Fund Dividend Program was established; or by decreasing funding at a rate of 20% per 
year until the program was eliminated.
Instead, in October 1980, the legislature established the Power Cost Assistance (PCA) 
program. The program was expanded from Hammond’s proposed changes and 
increased the subsidy limit to a range between 12.6 and 42.75 cents per kWh. For 
community facilities, it subsidized 55 kWh per month multiplied by the community 
population while also including charitable educational facilities. Finally, it removed the 
sunset provision and increased the minimum subsidized cost by one cent per year.
Most of these changes were again driven by political maneuvering. Through continued 
changes and expansion this program morphed into the program that exists to this day, 
Power Cost Equalization. In 1985, shortly after it was established, the origins of the 
program were described as follows in an Anchorage Daily News article:
Power Cost Equalization is the result of a legislative trade by urban politicians 
who wanted Bush support for massive hydroelectric projects -the proposed 
Susitna and Bradley Lake Projects in the Railbelt and four other dams in 
Southeast Alaska. In return for tens of millions of dollars in state money invested
2 PCE program data is calculated on a fiscal year basis. The fiscal year starts in July and ends in June. 
Estimation of figures in constant dollars is done using the average CPI for a fiscal year.
6in waterpower engineering and construction the Bush delegation won 
equalization. (Mauer, 1985).
Equalization was established although it remained controversial and many considered 
the arrangement as an unfair wealth distribution plan where “rural Alaska permanent 
subsidies would be part of the problem -  not a solution” (State of Alaska Division of 
Strategic Planning, 1985). Even so, to this day the PCE program continues to provide 
economic relief to rural communities throughout the state, but it does not address the 
problems of high costs and low cash incomes.
Power Cost Equalization Established
The Power Cost Equalization program was created in 1984 when the state Legislature 
enacted the Alaska Statutes 44.83.162-165 replacing the Power Cost Assistance 
program. The program became effective in October 20, 1984 (FY 1985) and was funded 
through appropriations from the general fund of about $6.67 million (2010$). The 
challenges of providing affordable and reliable power in rural Alaska have been ever 
present and they have compelled policy makers to take action. However, the decisions 
on how to structure assistance programs has been politically driven and to this day 
continue to impact the ability of rural Alaska communities to harness alternatives to 
electricity generated by diesel fuel. The history of the program is perceived to be one of 
expansion and cost containment battles due to continuous need for increased funding. 
However, the history of PCE is more complex.
The PCE program was the result of the debate of how to provide assistance to rural 
utilities in the late 70s which started with the simple concept of the Lifeline Rate to 
provide temporary cost relief and a survival level of power for rural consumers. Though 
this concept started the debate on how to structure a subsidy program, it was never 
implemented. Instead, the Power Production Cost Assistance program and later the 
Power Cost Assistance program were established. With the transition from PCA to PCE 
there was an important shift in purpose. With the previous programs the goal was to 
provide some level of temporary relief for rural customers that were paying high prices; 
distinctly PCE has the purpose of “equalizing power costs per kilowatt-hour statewide at 
a cost close or equal to the mean of the cost per kilowatt-hour in Anchorage, Fairbanks
7and Juneau by paying money from the fund to eligible electric utilities in the state” (State 
of Alaska, 1989). This is an important shift because as PCE is currently structured, as 
fuel prices increase and the price gap increases between rural and urban communities, 
rural communities need to receive larger subsidies in order to equalize electricity rates. 
This is because in the Railbelt area, Anchorage power is primarily provided by lower cost 
natural gas which has historically been a stable fuel source; Fairbanks though 
dependent on fossil fuels such as coal and diesel enjoy a less volatile local supply, as 
well as the benefits of the intertie with Anchorage; and southeast hub communities 
source much of their electricity with subsidized and stable hydroelectric resources 
enjoying relatively more affordable electricity prices. Equalization also makes the 
program indefinite because it implies that the program is to remain in place until rates 
between rural and urban areas are comparable. And thus, equalization is an 
economically unattainable goal, because urban and rural markets are inherently 
different, and so are the factors that affect their prices.
Power Cost Equalization Program Implementation
Almost a decade before PCE was established; the Alaska Legislature created the Alaska 
Power Authority (now Alaska Energy Authority) under House Bill 779 and signed into law 
by Governor Hammond on July 2, 1976. The purpose of the agency was to “promote, 
develop and advance the general prosperity and economic welfare of the people of 
Alaska by providing a means of constructing, acquiring, financing and operating.. .power 
projects...” (State of Alaska, 1989).
The responsibility of administering the PCE program, and its predecessors, was given 
to the Alaska Power Authority and the Alaska Public Utilities Commission (APUC, now 
the Regulatory Commission of Alaska). The responsibilities were divided such that the 
APUC would evaluate the utility eligibility and subsidy amount per kilowatt-hour, and 
APA would determine the eligible kilowatt-hours to be subsidized in order to calculate 
the appropriate payment and make the disbursement. These responsibilities remain to 
this day.
Because the program was crafted under a political background, the legislature 
established a criterion for utilities to be eligible to participate in the program, so that the 
urban areas and the regions that benefited from hydroelectric development (Four Dam
8Pool utilities, Kodiak, Port Lions, Valdez, Petersburg, Wrangell and Ketchikan) were 
excluded (Matz & Kreinheder, 1988). At its inception the program had the following key 
provisions:
V Utility provides electric service to the public for compensation
V During calendar year 1983 less than 7,500 megawatt-hours were sold to 
residential customers or less than 15,000 megawatt-hours if two communities 
were served and
V During calendar year 1984, diesel-fired generators were used to produce 75% of 
its electricity
The program was also designed and directed toward centralized utilities using diesel fuel 
to produce electricity. It was also designed to ease the ability of utilities to participate 
since according to statute “a utility may not be denied power cost equalization because 
complete cost information is not available” (State of Alaska, 1989). The Legislature also 
required that participating utilities submit a monthly report that “records monthly kilowatt- 
hour sales or generation, monthly fuel balances, fuel purchases and monthly utility fuel 
consumption” (State of Alaska, 1989). AEA would then review these monthly reports, 
check the calculations, determine the appropriate payment and make the disbursement. 
Over time changes to PCE have been mostly in two categories, increased levels of 
funding and changes to eligibility constraints as means of cost containment. Table 1 
shows the differences across the programs, which in their basic structure and funding 
formulas are quite similar.
9Table 1: Differences o f implemented power cost assistance programs
PPCA PCA PCE PCE PCE
(F Y 1981) (FY 1982-1985) (F Y 1985) (FY2000) (FY 2011)
Entry rate (2010 
cents/kWh)
18.4 24.3 17.2 15.2 14.0
Ceiling rate 
(2010 cents/kWh)
96.0 91.2 106.4 66.5 100.0
Eligible costs for 
reimbursement
85% 95%
Eligible costs for 
reimbursement over ceiling
Yes, 100% No
Consumption Limits -  
Community Facilities 
kWh/month
None
55 kWh per 
Resident
70 kWh per Resident
Residential & Commercial 500
Consumption Limits N/A 600 750c Commercial no longer
kWh/month eligible
Eligible cost categories for 
reimbursement
generation
and
transmission
generation, transmission, distribution and administrative
Note: Community facilities is defined as water and sewer facilities, charitable educational facilities, public 
lighting, or community buildings whose operations are not paid by the state, federal government or 
private commercial party. Starting in 1993, the PCE eligible kWh per month limit dropped to 700.
Source: Modified table “Comparison of PPCA, PCA, PCE and PCE-REC” (Brooks, 1995).
Because PCE was not the first subsidy structure to be introduced, the sharp growth of 
the program happened mostly during the PPCA and PCA with another significant 
increase during the first year of PCE. As Figure 1 shows, there was a rapid increase in 
appropriations and disbursements from 1981, when PPCA was implemented, to about 
1986, one year after the transition to the PCE program criteria3. It was in 1986 that the 
peak level of appropriations for the program occurred, about $43.2 million (2010$). This 
increase during the early years was due to higher number of participating utilities. Only 
15 utilities participated in the PCCA program but that number more than doubled in
3 Historical data was gathered from PCE Annual Statistical Reports published by the Alaska Energy 
Authority since 1988.
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1982 when it change to the PCA program and it continued growing until about 1988; by 
then almost 100 utilities were participating in the PCE program. Currently, only 84 
utilities are participating in the PCE program representing 185 communities. However, 
some cooperative utilities have increased the number of communities they represent. 
For example, in 1985 the Alaska Village Electric Cooperative (AVEC) represented about 
46 communities receiving PCE, and it represented about 52 communities in 2010; also 
the Alaska Power and Telephone Company (AP&T) represented only 4 communities in 
1985, but in 2010 it represented 21 communities. Overall, the number of people served 
has increased about 33% over time. In 1985, about 59,000 people were assisted 
through the PCE program. About 78,431 people were assisted during fiscal year 2010. 
There has been a historic tension between high oil prices that benefit the state treasury 
and the impacts of high prices on Alaskan households. When oil prices are high, state 
coffers overflow, but these high prices simultaneously put strains on household budgets. 
As a result of higher costs and lower median incomes, high energy prices are especially 
hard on rural residents (Saylor, Hayley, & Szymoniak, 2008). When oil prices fall, state 
budgets are strained in their capacity to pay for any programs, including those directed 
at relieving rural household energy costs, which remain high as a result of high fixed 
costs.
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Figure 1: PCE Appropriations, Disbursements and Distillate Fuel Oil Prices per Gallon in the Electric 
Sector over Time. Source: PCE Statistical Reports 1988-2010 and author’s calculations.
Seven years after the PCE program was established, funding the program became a 
challenge as world oil prices sharply decreased lowering state revenues. Since 
inception, the program was not fully funded by the Legislature in 15 out of 25 fiscal 
years. In 1990, in an attempt to contain costs, the Legislature directed the Alaska Public 
Utilities Commission to implement new efficiency and line loss standards and to more 
clearly define eligible costs. To further address high operating costs, AEA provided 
technical support, preventative maintenance and upgrading/replacing equipment of rural 
utilities (Pourchot, 1990).
In FY 1992, the program was pro-rated to 80% eligible PCE payments because of 
funding shortfalls for eleven months of the year. One year later, the Power Cost 
Equalization and Rural Electric Capitalization Fund (the PCE fund) was created by the 
Legislature with an appropriation of $101 million (2010$). During subsequent years, PCE
12
expenses were drawn exclusively from the PCE fund and were nearly spent by the end 
of FY 1999 (State of Alaska, Office of the Governor, 1999). This continued to be an 
issue until FY 2000 when the PCE program had full funding for one year.4 Then, during 
FY 2001, the PCE Endowment fund was created. Originally the fund was capitalized 
using the proceeds from the sale of the Four Dam Pool Projects and funds from the 
Constitutional Budget Reserve. Later in 2007, the fund was once again capitalized with 
general funds. The Rural Electric Capitalization Fund and PCE program costs are 
appropriated using dividends from the PCE fund5 (Alaska Energy Authority, 2009). For 
the last three fiscal years, the PCE program again received full funding. Last year the 
legislature appropriated an additional $400 million for the PCE endowment fund.
Coping with volatile and generally increasing crude and fuel oil prices has been a 
challenge for the PCE program since its inception. Average fuel oil prices in the power 
sector in Alaska increased sharply between FY 1980 and FY 1981, and then decreased 
sharply until FY 1986. For participating utilities, average fuel oil prices were highly 
volatile but the average annual real price of fuel was relatively stable between FY 1981 
and FY 1986. Because PCE was not fully funded in most years from FY 1992 through 
FY 2007, fuel prices and program payments were not highly correlated. Figure 1 also 
shows how after the first year the PCE program was created, the total amount of funds 
disbursed steadily decreased while fuel oil prices had a volatile but relatively flat trend. 
However, after FY 2005 high fuel prices and program growth resulted in record high 
PCE disbursements. In FY 2009, coinciding with the 2008 crude oil price run up, PCE 
disbursements increased to about $37 million (2010$).
Total electricity (kWh) sales of participating utilities steadily increased until FY 1999, the 
last year commercial customers where eligible to receive the PCE credit (Figure 2). 
Some of this increase resulted from additional utilities participating in the program. In FY 
1999, in addition to eliminating reimbursements to commercial customers, the number of 
eligible kWh per month per residential customer was also decreased from 700 to 500 
kWh. After that adjustment, consumption re-adjusted and continued an upward trend. 
However, the total number of kilowatt-hours eligible for reimbursement has remained
4 Appendix A details PCE funding levels per year
5 The fund is managed by the Department of Revenue; it is invested to earn 7% over time. Seven 
percent of the fund’s 3-year monthly average returns may be appropriated.
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relatively flat over time following adjustments in eligibility levels in FY 19936 and FY 
2000. During the years of the PCE predecessor programs both sales and eligible 
kilowatt-hours exhibited higher growth, largely due to the increase in the number of 
participating utilities. In CY 2010 there were 190 eligible communities who participated in 
the PCE program (Table 2).
Fiscal Year
PCE Eligible MWh Total MWh Sold Average Residential Monthly Payment
Figure 2: Power Sold, PCE Eligible kWh and Average Residential Monthly Payment, 1981 to 2010.
Source: PCE Annual Statistical Reports 1988-2010 and author's calculations.
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Table 2: Utilities/communities e ligible and participating in PCE program, CY 2010
AEA Energy Region Yes Inactive No Total Percent Active
Aleutians 12 1 0 13 92%
Bering Straits 17 0 0 17 100%
Bristol Bay 25 1 0 26 96%
Copper River/Chugach 6 0 2 8 75%
Kodiak 4 1 1 6 67%
Lower Yukon-Kuskokwim 48 0 0 48 100%
North Slope 7 1 0 8 88%
Northwest Arctic 12 1 0 13 92%
Railbelt 0 0 14 14 0%
Southeast 21 0 10 31 68%
Yukon-Koyukuk/Upper Tanana 38 3 2 43 88%
Total 190 8 29 227 84%
Note: For utilities that serve multiple communities with no grid such as AVEC and AP&T, 
each community is counted individually. Source: Alaska Energy Statistics Report 1960-2010 
(Fay, Villalobos Melendez, & Converse, 2011)
The average number of eligible kilowatt-hours grew at about 5% per year since FY 1985; 
the average annual population growth in participating utility communities was 2% over 
the same time period. Figure 2 shows kilowatt-hours sold, PCE eligible kWh and the 
average residential monthly payment per customer since disbursements became 
available to residential customers. The sharp declining trend during the 1990s and first 
half of 2000s results from pro-rated PCE disbursements due to lack of funding (Appendix 
A). Figure 3 shows kWh sold and PCE eligible kWh with average kWh sold per capita; 
notably per capita electricity consumption continued to steadily rise in the years of pro­
rated funding. The sharp increase starting in FY 1985 coincides with the increase in 
eligible kWh from 600 (under the PCA program) to 750 after the PCE program was 
instituted and the increase in participating utilities. The sharp decrease in per capita 
consumption between FY 1987 and FY 1988 coincides with the crash of the Alaska 
economy due to a drastic decrease in world oil prices.7
7 Though oil prices decrease, the effects of the economic crash on lowering economic activity and 
income were likely the cause of the decrease in consumption.
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Figure 3: Power Sold, PCE Eligible kWh and Average Annual kWh Sold per Capita, 1981 to 2010.
Source: PCE Annual Statistical Reports 1988-2010 and author's calculations.
PCE Level Funding Formula
The PCE program reduces the kWh electric rates charged to rural residents in areas 
where residential rates are high. The RCA determines utility eligibility and the PCE level 
(the amount paid per kWh). The PCE level is determined by a formula based on a 
utility’s costs or rates, whichever is less (Figure 4).
Lesser of
PCE Level = [(Non Fuel Costs/kWh Sold + Fuel Costs/kWh Sold) -  Base Rate] * 95%
or
Figure 4: PCE Level Funding Formula. Source: Power Cost Equalization Program Guide (Alaska Energy 
Authority, 2009).
A utility’s PCE payment per kWh is determined by a formula that covers 95% of a utility’s 
cost between a floor or base rate (average rate for Anchorage, Fairbanks and Juneau, 
13.42 cents/kWh) and a ceiling (currently $1.00) for a defined level of consumption (500 
kWh for residential customers, and 70 kWh per month multiplied by the community’s
PCE Rate = [Residential Rate -Base Rate] * 95%,
if < maximum allowed rate
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population for public facilities). The PCE level is re-calculated for eligible utilities once a 
year by RCA. State and Federal customers as well as commercial customers are not 
eligible for the PCE credit.
There are other factors that also affect the calculation of the PCE level including 
minimum efficiency standards for diesel generation depending on the quantity of 
electricity the utility produces. Table 3 shows how utilities that produce more than 80% of 
electricity from diesel have slightly higher efficiency standards than those who produce 
less than 80% of electricity from diesel. Also, utilities that produce more kilowatt-hours 
are expected to have higher levels of efficiency. In addition, a maximum 12% distribution 
line loss standard is expected from all utilities. If the minimum level of efficiency or the 
line loss exceeds the standards allowed, the PCE level is decreased. An important 
consideration related to these standards is that they have not been updated to keep up 
with technological change since they were implemented in FY 1990.
Table 3: PCE Minimum Efficiency Standards fo r Electricity Generation
Total Diesel Generation
Total Generation (kWh) More than 80% Less than 80%
kWh/gal kWh/gal
0 to 99,999 9.5 8.5
100000 to 499,999 10.5 10.0
500000 to 999,999 11.5 11.0
1000000 to 9,999,999 12.5 12.0
More than 10,000,000 13.5 13.0
Source: Table recreated from the PCE Program Guide (Alaska Energy Authority, 2009).
Participating utilities are required to file reports with both RCA and AEA; these reports 
are used to approve costs and determine the utility’s PCE reimbursement rate per kWh. 
Unregulated utilities must file an annual report with RCA accompanied by accounting 
documentation such as balance sheets, invoices and other details to support their costs. 
RCA uses these records to verify allowable costs for power production. If RCA deems 
any of the costs ineligible, those costs are not included in the calculation of the PCE 
level. Regulated utilities can also request a Cost of Power Adjustment (COPA) to adjust 
their fuel costs between PCE level adjustments. Most utilities participating in the PCE 
program are unregulated (about 73%).
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In addition to annual reports, all participating utilities must file a monthly report with AEA 
containing production and sales information including total kWh generated, gallons of 
fuel used, and kilowatt-hours sold. This report is used to determine the number of 
kilowatt-hours eligible for PCE level reimbursement. Utilities also submit copies of their 
customer ledger documents that AEA uses to verify that kilowatt-hours sold are eligible. 
Utilities self report to RCA and AEA; the agencies and their functions relative to the PCE 
program are independent. Utilities are instructed to submit consistent information to both 
agencies, but there is no on-going process to audit or reconcile the consistency of the 
information provided to both agencies.
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Chapter 2 Renewable Energy Fund 
Early Alaska Renewable Energy Efforts
Unlike the PCE program, the Renewable Energy Fund (REF) does not have a long 
history. However, there is a long history of public policy concerns related to dependence 
on volatile and sometimes high priced fossil fuel energy. During times of high oil prices 
and thus, high and energy costs for residents, state focused on developing alternatives 
to diesel fired generators in rural Alaska, and large-scale renewable energy sources for 
urban areas. The REF program does not have direct predecessors as the PCE does 
(PPCA, PCA). But rather, it is one more tool in a portfolio of actions and programs 
established by the Legislature to advance renewable energy development. It is not my 
intention to provide a comprehensive history of Alaska’s energy policy, but rather to 
provide historic highlights regarding renewable energy and conservation at the time that 
PCE was established and then fast forward to current events regarding the creation of 
the Renewable Energy Fund Program.
A few years before the PCE program was established, legislators debated the 
development of a number of hydroelectric projects. Part of the debate revolved around 
the desirable way to fund these projects; one using state oil revenues through the 
Permanent Fund or through market mechanisms such as revenue bonds through the 
Alaska Power Authority.8 Much of the attention focused on moving the Susitna 
hydroelectric project forward. During the same 1979 session, House Bill 364 and House 
Bill 309 were unsuccessfully introduced. They were intended to address issues of 
conservation; alternative technologies; and thermal, lightning and energy audits. Before 
the 1980 Legislative session, a large number of energy reports were completed. At least 
eight of them directly addressed alternative energy resources and conservation.9 
During 1980, the focus was on the omnibus energy bill of HCS SB 438 which "contained 
most of the energy legislation on the table” (State of Alaska Division of Strategic 
Planning, 1985). The bill authorized, among other energy legislation, $70 million for 
Tyee Lake and $120 million each for Swan Lake and Terror Lake hydroelectric projects
8 The creation of the Alaska Power Authority (APA) was around the same time this debate was 
happening (1976). So the debate was also about creating APA and how much power would the 
authority should have.
9 As listed in The Energy Program for Alaska; Origins and Evolution, 1985.
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as well as nine other projects. The bill “mostly...expressed the House Democratic 
Majority’s concern for alternative technology and energy conservation” (State of Alaska 
Division of Strategic Planning, 1985). The political pressure to build the Susitna Dam 
continued to mount as job creation became a key component. Though advancing 
conservation and developing alternative energy were genuine concerns, the underlying 
driver was building the Susitna hydroelectric project. For the next several years, the 
politics centered on securing votes to pass hydroelectric projects in the southeast region 
and Susitna, but mostly debating financing mechanism and securing funding for the 
projects. Legislators from the southeast region felt compelled to support Susitna to avoid 
repaying loans and to secure their own hydroelectric projects since in their view “it was 
obvious that diesel costs would exceed stabilized hydro cost at some time in the 
fu tu re .” (Bob Martin-THREA10, as cited in State of Alaska Division of Strategic 
Planning, 1985).
Renewable Energy Fund History
The Renewable Energy Fund was established by the Alaska State Legislature, House 
Bill 152, in April, 2008 under AS 42.45.045. The new program was received with great 
enthusiasm by the utilities and Alaska rural communities. The fund is perceived as a
grant program to promote renewable energy projects but the legislature’s intentions were 
broader. Some of the main goals of the program are motivated by the following (HB 152, 
2008):
• need to lower cost of energy, in fact the legislature stated:“Residents of rural Alaska 
pay far more for electricity than residents who live on the Railbelt energy grid”
• to develop Alaska renewable energy resources
• to maintain the state’s competitiveness
• to promote industry and jobs
The intention of the State Legislature was to appropriate capital funds of $50 million per 
year for 5 years (HB0152F, 2008). Notwithstanding, in June 2010 Governor Sean 
Parnell vetoed the appropriations approved by the Legislature and cut them in half to 
$25 million (Renewable Energy Alaska Project, 2011). To date, the legislature has 
appropriated $150 million which have funded more than 100 projects. Over the course of
10 THREA -  Tlingit-Haida Regional Electric Authority
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four rounds, AEA has received more than 460 applications requesting almost $ 1.1 
billion in funding (Fay, Villalobos Meledez, & Crimp, 2012, unpublished data).
The program is administrated by the Alaska Energy Authority. In addition, the program 
receives input from the Renewable Energy Fund Advisory Committee. The functions of 
the committee are to support the development of eligibility and evaluation criteria for 
projects requesting grants. In the early months of 2011, Governor Sean Parnell 
reappointed Chris Rose, the Executive Director of the Renewable Energy Alaska 
Project, Brad Reeve, the General Manager and Chief Executive Officer of Kotzebue 
Electric Association and James Posey, the General Manager at Anchorage Municipal 
Light & Power to the committee (Renewable Energy Alaska Project, 2011).
The Renewable Energy Fund is not the only program the State has created to try to 
tackle the issues of high energy costs. Recently, during the 26th legislative session, two 
major bills were passed: Senate Bill 220, the Alaska Sustainable Energy Act and House 
Bill 306, An Act declaring a state energy policy. The senate bill seeks to improve energy 
efficiency in public buildings, established the Emerging Energy Technology Fund, added 
a tax credit for renewable energy production, developed methodology to collect and 
store energy consumption and expense data among other actions. As well, HB 306 
records the legislative intent of the state of Alaska to increase energy efficiency per 
capita by 15% by 2020, to increase its electric generation to 50% from renewable 
sources by 2025 and to declare the state energy policy stating the following:
. th e  state’s economic prosperity is dependent on available, reliable and 
affordable residential, commercial and industrial energy to supply the state’s 
electric, heating and transportation needs.It is the policy of the state to (1) 
institute a comprehensive and coordinated approach to supporting energy 
efficiency and conservation. [and] (2) encourage economic development 
by.promoting the development of renewable alternative resources. (HB306 
FIN am S, 2010)
The capital budget for fiscal year 2012 appropriated over $303 million for various 
renewable energy projects (including REF projects) and energy conservation programs 
including the Alaska Housing Finance Corporation Weatherization Program and Home 
Energy Rebate Program, the Alternative Energy Conservation Revolving Loan Fund, 
and the Emerging Energy Technology Fund.
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Renewable Energy Fund Grant Process
This grant program follows a strict process that intends to allocate the funds in a fair 
manner to those communities with the highest need and that have greater probability of 
succeeding. The process goes as follows:
1. Application is submitted to AEA
2. Economic analysis is performed by contractual economists
3. Economic analysis reviewed/modified by third party quality assurance team
4. Resource technical analysis by AEA’s Program Managers
5. AEA recommends projects and respective funding to the legislature
6. Legislature decides whether to fund the project and appropriates funds
7. AEA responsible for disbursement and management of grants
Once a final scoring of the project is made, all projects are ranked by region. As 
illustrated by Table 4, each application is evaluated using a point-weighted system that 
analyzes the project viability in a holistic way and places greatest weight in cost of 
energy, but also taking into account the sustainability of the project.
Table 4: Criterion fo r Project Evaluation
Evaluation Factor Weight
Cost of energy 25%
Matching funds 20%
Economic and technical feasibility 20%
Economic and Other Alaska benefits 15%
Project readiness 10%
Sustainability 5%
Local Support 5%
Source: REF Evaluation Guidelines (Alaska Energy Authority, 2011).
The grant administrative cycle has completed four rounds and it finalizing the fifth round. 
As Table 5 shows, the number of applications has been relatively stable over the four 
rounds averaging about 112 applications per year. Most of the applications requesting 
funds, about 26%, have been for wind projects, closely followed by hydroelectric at 
about 25% and biomass standing as a distant third at about 15% (Figure 5).
22
Table 5: Summary o f RE Fund grants and funding as o f January 21, 2012
Category Round I Round II Round III Round IV Round V Total
Applications Received 112 118 123 108 97 558
Projects Funded 79 30 25 74 TBD 208
Grants in Place 72 29 19 50 0 170
Grants Cancelled 5 1 2 0 0 8
Amount Requested ($M) $453.8 $293.4 $223.5 $123.1 $132.9 $1,226.7
AEA Recommended ($M) $100.0 $36.8 $65.8 $36.6 $43.1 $282.3
Appropriated ($M) $100.0 $25.0 $25 26.6 TBD $176.6
Cash Disbursed ($M) $54.4 $16.7 $6 $2.6 $0 $79.7
Available for reallocation ($M) $0 $0 $0.2 $0 $0 $0.2
Source: Reproduced table from Alaska REF Status Report (Alaska Energy Authority, 2012).
4%
Figure 5: Applications by energy type. Source: Alaska Renewable Energy Fund Grant Program: How it 
Works and Lessons We’ve Learned (Fay, Villalobos Meledez, & Crimp, 2012, unpublished data).
Wind energy has been the larger beneficiary of the REF grants receiving about 33% of 
all of funds appropriated as Figure 6 shows.
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Figure 6: D istribution o f Total Funds Appropriated by Project Type. Source: Alaska Renewable Energy 
Fund Grant Program: How it Works and Lessons We’ve Learned (Fay, Villalobos Meledez, & Crimp, 2012, 
unpublished data).
However, the amount of funds requested has decreased in each round, and by Round V 
it has decreased about 71%. Thought the number of applications requesting funds for 
hydroelectric and wind projects has been comparable, a higher proportion of wind 
projects were recommended for funding as Figure 6 shows. It is clear that wind 
development has expanded by the REF program in a significant way. In fact, most wind 
turbines installed in Alaska were installed since 2008 when the program was established 
though not all newer wind projects have received REF funding.
Though on average funds appropriated were close to the $50 million per year intended, 
the first round of applications benefited from approximately two years worth of 
appropriations (approximately $100 million) while subsequent rounds were only a 
quarter of the first round appropriations. Reflective of the changes in the levels of 
appropriations, the number of projects funded also decreased with each round with only 
25 projects funded in the third round. Only about 45% of the total funds appropriated 
have actually been disbursed. This is a reflection of the caution and efforts of strong 
level of accountability approach AEA has taken to distributing funds by first writing 
detailed grant agreements and only providing funds through an invoice reimbursement
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process. However, this also translates into a slow and bureaucratic process that does 
not result in rapid alternative energy deployment.
Over the course of four rounds the Southeast region has had the larger number of 
projects funded, about 21% of total, followed by the Railbelt (18%) and the Lower 
Yukon-Kuskokwim region a distant third (10%). Overall rural communities account for 
just over half (52%) of the funded projects (Figure 7).
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Figure 7: Number o f Projects Funded by Region. Source: Alaska Renewable Energy Fund Grant 
Program: How it Works and Lessons We’ve Learned (Fay, Villalobos Meledez, & Crimp, 2012, unpublished 
data).
Following a somewhat similar pattern, as Figure 8 shows, the Southeast region has 
received the largest share, about 19%, of funding, followed by the Railbelt receiving 
about 16% and the Lower Yukon-Kuskokwim region a close third receiving about 15% of 
the funding. Overall, rural communities have received about 51% of the funding.
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Chapter 3 Review of Electricity Consumption and Rates in Alaska Regions and
PCE Communities
In Alaska there are large regional differences in consumption and prices that result from 
proximity to different types and quantities of resources. Differences in remoteness and 
population size also influence costs. Urban areas in the southern Railbelt benefit from 
larger economies of scale and access to natural gas and hydroelectric resources; the 
majority of hydroelectric facilities are located in Southcentral and Southeast Alaska.
Most communities in rural Alaska depend on fossil fuels for the generation of electricity 
and have to cope with the volatility of diesel fuel prices. These differences result in 
significant differences in energy consumption and prices. The Alaska Energy Authority 
(AEA) uses eleven energy regions to help identify large geographic areas with similar 
characteristics. These AEA energy regions are used in this review (Figure 9).
In CY 2009, U.S. residential customers consumed an average of 10,896 kWh per year or 
908 kWh per month; the average residential rate was 9.8 cents/kWh. There is no region 
in Alaska with that level of electricity consumption. Even the region with the highest 
annual residential consumption (North Slope) consumes almost 25% less (8,230 kWh). 
The state with the lowest average residential consumption in 2009 was Maine (6,252 
kWh). Only two Alaska regions have higher average consumption levels, North Slope 
(8,230 kWh) and Railbelt (7,514).
Average annual per customer residential consumption in most Alaska regions is 
between 4,000 and 6,000 kWh per year or 333 and 500 kWh per month. The Yukon- 
Koyukuk/Upper T anana region has the lowest at just over 3,000 kWh per year or 250 
kWh per month. Within geographic regions there is also considerable variation. For 
example, in the Railbelt average annual consumption in Fairbanks is 8,285 kWh and 
Anchorage is 7,475 kWh. Table 6 lists the average annual residential consumption per 
customer for years 2008 to 2010.
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Table 6: Average Residential Consumption by AEA Energy Region
kWh per Customer
AEA Region 2008 2009 2010
Aleutians 4,776 4,788 5,014
Bering Straits 4,569 4,751 4,524
Bristol Bay 4,219 3,910 4,131
Copper River/Chugach 4,054 4,297 4,331
Kodiak 4,380 4,779 5,145
Lower Yukon-Kuskokwim 4,157 4,262 4,333
North Slope 5,918 7,480 8,230
Northwest Arctic 5,537 5,755 5,860
Railbelt 8,080 7,897 7,514
Southeast 6,130 6,256 6,007
Yukon-Koyukuk/Upper Tanana 3,191 3,348 3,322
Source: Alaska Energy Statistics Report 1960-2010 (Fay, Villalobos Melendez, & Converse, Alaska Energy
Statistics 1960-2010, Preliminary Data, 2011).
Figure 9: Alaska Energy Regions Map and PCE Eligible Communities. Source: Alaska Energy Authority.
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The Alaska statewide weighted average residential rate for electricity (16 cents per kWh 
in CY2009) is significantly higher in than the U.S. average of 9.8 cents per kWh. Hidden 
in the statewide average is considerable variation with some communities paying less 
than the national average and some paying over ten times as much (even when 
considering Power Cost Equalization program effective rate). Similar to consumption, 
differences between and within regions are very large. Table 7 shows that the Railbelt 
and Southeast regions have the lowest average residential rates. North Slope residential 
customers also have lower average rates because some communities in the North Slope 
region have access to relatively more affordable natural gas and also additional subsidy 
payments from North Slope Borough. Most other regions have rates over three times as 
much as urban Alaska areas. Some communities with hydroelectric power have the 
lowest rates but in most cases customers are not paying the full, true cost of power 
because the cost of infrastructure was heavily subsidized by state and federal 
governments.
Table 7: Average Residential E lectricity Rates by AEA Region
Before PCE After PCE
Region 2008 2009 2010 2008 2009 2010
Aleutians 0.48 0.40 0.44 0.22 0.21 0.21
Bering Straits 0.41 0.47 0.44 0.16 0.20 0.21
Bristol Bay 0.43 0.50 0.47 0.17 0.21 0.28
Copper River/Chugach 0.28 0.25 0.26 0.18 0.19 0.18
Kodiak 0.20 0.17 0.18 0.12 0.13 0.16
Lower Yukon-Kuskokwim 0.52 0.58 0.52 0.19 0.22 0.24
North Slope 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.11 0.13 0.12
Northwest Arctic 0.48 0.56 0.51 0.21 0.20 0.21
Railbelt 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.15
Southeast 0.14 0.10 0.12 0.09 0.10 0.10
Yukon-Koyukuk/Upper Tanana 0.53 0.52 0.52 0.20 0.22 0.23
Source: Alaska Energy Statistics Report 1960-2010 (Fay, Villalobos Melendez, & Converse, 2011).
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A review of specific characteristics of resources, consumption and rates in all AEA 
regions follows below. The figures provided in these summaries are based on CY 2010 
data from the Alaska Energy Statistics Report 1960-2010 accompanying Excel files11.
Aleutians
The Aleutians Region includes eleven communities. Most communities in this region 
generate electricity with fuel oil; only about 5% of power generation in the region is from 
hydroelectric resources. Average annual consumption per customer for communities in 
this region is between 5,000-6,000 kWh. Communities such as Adak, Nikolski, Nelson 
Lagoon and False Pass have some of the lowest consumption (about 3,500 kWh) in the 
region while communities such as Dutch Harbor, Cold Bay, Saint Paul and King Cove 
have the highest consumption, almost twice as much as communities with the lowest 
levels. These communities benefit from larger economies of scale not only because they 
have significantly more residential customers but because they also have more large 
commercial customers. Without PCE, the communities in this region would pay almost 
four times more for electricity than the urban customers in the Railbelt. However, with 
PCE, average rates in the Aleutians region range from about 14-36 cents per kWh.
Bering Straits
The Bering Straits region includes sixteen communities. Most communities in this region 
generate electricity with fuel oil; only about 5% of power generation in the region is from 
wind resources. Average consumption per customer for communities in this region is 
between 4,000-6,000 kWh per year. Communities such as Diomede, White Mountain, 
Teller and Nome have the lowest levels of consumption ranging from about 3,000-3,500 
kWh per year. Koyuk, Saint Michael and Shaktoolik have the highest levels of 
consumption (almost 6,000kwh). Residential rates range from 36 cents/kWh (Nome) to 
72 cents/kWh (White Mountain) before PCE. However, average rates after PCE 
adjustment range from 14 to 44 cents/kWh with most communities (13 of 16) paying 
between 33%-66% more than urban customers in the Railbelt.
11 Alaska Energy Statistics Report 1960-2010
http://www.iser.uaa.alaska.edu/Publications/AlaskaEnerqyStatisticsCY2010Tables.xlsx
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Bristol Bay
The Bristol Bay region includes twenty two communities. Almost all electricity in Bristol 
Bay is generated using fuel oil. Communities in the Bristol Bay region have an average 
consumption per customer ranging between about 3,000 to less than 6,000 kWh per 
year. Communities such as Levelock, Pilot Point, Egegik and Koliganek have the lowest 
levels of consumption just over 3,000 kWh per year. Chignik Lagoon, New Stuyahok and 
Dillingham have the highest levels of consumption of over 5,000 kWh per year. 
Residential rates before PCE range between 43 to 92 cents/kWh (about three to six 
times higher than urban customers). Average rates after PCE adjustment range from 
about 15 to 50 cents/kWh. The highest rates after PCE adjustment are paid by Perryville 
and Pedro Bay customers, which pay over three times more than urban customers.
Copper River/Chugach
The Copper River/Chugach region includes seven communities. Over half (55%) of all 
electric generation in this region is done using hydroelectric resources while the rest 
(45%) is generated using fuel oil. Communities in the Copper River/Chugach region 
have an average consumption per customer ranging from about 3,300 to 6,200 kWh per 
year. Valdez and Cordova have the highest consumption and benefit from hydroelectric 
power generation. Chitina and Slana have the lowest consumption levels. Residential 
rates before PCE range from 22 to 66 cents/kWh. After PCE, average rates range from 
16 to 41 cents/kWh; Tatitlek pays the highest rate.
Kodiak
The Kodiak region includes five communities. Most of the electricity generation in Kodiak 
is done using renewable resources, about 84 from hydro and about 9% from wind; only 
8% of electricity is done using fuel oil. Communities in the Kodiak region have an 
average consumption per customer ranging from almost 4,000 to over 7,000 kWh per 
year. Kodiak and Karluk have the highest levels of consumption. Kodiak has large 
hydroelectric resources and largest wind generation installed capacity in Alaska, 
producing almost all of its power with renewable resources. Old Harbor and Ouzinkie 
have the lowest consumption levels. Residential rates before PCE range from 18 to 60
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cents/kWh. After PCE, average rates range from 18 to 26 cents kWh; Karluk and Larsen 
Bay pay the highest rates.
Lower Yukon-Kuskokwim
The Lower Yukon-Kuskokwim region includes 45 communities. Most of the electricity 
generation in this region is done using fuel oil (98%), although recently a small amount, 
about 2%, is from wind resources. The Lower Yukon-Kuskokwim region includes a large 
number of communities (44) and has a wide range of average consumption per 
customer from about 1,000 to just over 6,000 kWh per year. Lime Village, Stony River 
and Newtok have the lowest levels of consumption (less 2,000 kWh) while Bethel and 
Napaskiak have the highest levels of consumption (over 6,000 kWh). Average residential 
rates before PCE range from 42 cents/kWh to $1.17 per kWh. After PCE, residential 
rates range from about 13 to 75 cents per kWh. Lime Village pays the highest rate, and 
Newtok a distant second pays about 39 cents/kWh. About seven communities12 in this 
region have wind turbines producing a portion of their electricity.
North Slope
The North Slope region includes eight communities. A unique characteristic of this 
region as compared to other rural Alaska regions is that almost two thirds of their 
electricity generation is done using natural gas and only 34% is produced from fuel oil. 
Natural gas is used in electric generation in the communities of Barrow and Nuiqsut.
Also, unlike other regions in rural Alaska, residential customers in the North Slope 
regions consume electricity at the same levels as urban customers. Average 
consumption in this region ranges from about 7,500 kWh to almost 10,000 kWh. 
Anaktuvuk Pass and Kaktovik have the lowest levels of consumption while Atqasuk and 
Point Hope have the highest. Residential rates before PCE range from 12 to 17 cents. 
Some communities receive small PCE adjustments and in some cases consumers may 
enjoy even lower rates than urban consumers because the electricity rates are also 
subsidized by the borough.
12 The seven communities are: Chevak, Hooper Bay, Kasigluk, Mekoryuk, Quinhagak, Toksook Bay and 
Kongiganak; for details on wind generation in 2010 please see Alaska Energy Statistics Report 1960-2010 
http://www.iser.uaa.alaska.edu/Publications/AlaskaEnergyStatisticsCY2010Tables.xlsx
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Northwest Arctic
The Northwest Arctic region includes ten communities. Most electricity generation in this 
region is done using fuel oil (91%), followed by a small amount of renewable resources, 
about 7% from hydroelectric and 2% from wind. The Northwest Arctic region consumes 
electricity closer to the levels of urban consumers. Average residential consumption per 
customer ranges from almost 5,000 kWh to almost 8,000 kWh. Ambler, Kobuk and 
Kiana have the lowest levels of consumption while Shungnak, Noatak and Kotzebue 
have the highest levels. Residential rates before PCE are high, ranging from 47 to 87 
cents per kWh. However, after PCE rates range from 17 to 30 cents per kWh; Buckland 
and Kobuk have the highest rates.
Railbelt
The Railbelt includes five urban communities: Anchorage, Palmer-Wasilla, Fairbanks, 
Homer and Seward and are not eligible for the PCE adjustment. There are six 
interconnected utilities that serve this region.13 These utilities not only serve the main 
urban centers but also a number of communities along the Railbelt that are connected to 
the grid (Appendix C). Most of the electricity generated in the Railbelt is from natural 
gas (72%), followed by fuel oil (11%), hydroelectric (10%) and coal (8%).14 Average 
residential consumption per customer ranges from over 7,000 to almost 8,500 kWh per 
year. Homer has the lowest consumption levels while Palmer (Mat-Su area) has the 
highest consumption levels. Average residential rates range from 13 cents/kWh in 
Anchorage to 20 cents/kWh in Fairbanks.
13 These utilities are: Chugach Electric Association (CEA), Anchorage Municipal Light & Power 
(AML&P), Golden Valley Electric Association (GVEA), Homer Electric Association (HEA), 
Matanuska Electric Association (MEA), and Seward Electric Association (SEA). In addition, 
Copper Valley Electric Association (CVEA) serves two small communities in the Railbelt region 
Lake Louise and Nelchina. CEA is the main utility provider for the Cooper River/Chugach area as 
defined by the AEA Energy Regions.
14 Generation by fuel type figures are estimates for CY 2010 from the Alaska Energy Statistics 
Report 1960-2010 (Fay, Villalobos Melendez, & Converse, Alaska Energy Statistics 1960-2010, 
Preliminary Data, 2011) available at
http://www.iser.uaa.alaska.edu/Publications/AlaskaEnergyStatisticsCY2010Report.pdf
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Southeast
The Southeast region includes twenty-six communities and consumption varies 
significantly across communities. Some communities have abundant hydroelectric 
resources while other communities may be significantly smaller and only have diesel 
generation systems. In total about 97% of all electric generation in Southeast is 
produced with hydro while only 3% is produced with fuel oil. Average residential 
consumption per customer ranges from almost 2,000 to just over 15,000 kWh per year.
A portion of the consumption in communities with the highest consumption is due to the 
use electric heating. Communities with the highest levels of consumption (above 10,000 
kWh/year) include Ketchikan, Metlakatla, Wrangell, Sitka and Petersburg; none of these 
communities are eligible to receive PCE. However, most other communities (20) in the 
region are eligible and receive PCE; this is because they generate electricity mostly with 
fuel oil and have rates up to two or three times as much as the subsidized hydro 
communities with lower rates. For example, even after the PCE adjustment communities 
such as Angoon, Hoonah, Whale Pass among others pay about 20 cents/kWh and 
Tenakee Springs paid the highest average rate of about 30 cents/kWh. The average 
residential rate for these high consumption communities is between 9 and 11 cents per 
kWh; again these lower rates are the result of subsidized infrastructure and do not reflect 
the true cost of power from these facilities. Communities with the lowest levels of 
consumption (below 2,000 kWh/year) include Gustavus, Elfin Cove and Tenakee 
Springs, which also have a relatively high portion of seasonal second homes. Average 
residential rates for the rest of the region range between 21 and 64 cents per kWh, 
before PCE. After PCE, average residential rates range from 15 to 32 cents per kWh; 
Tenakee Springs and Gustavus have the highest rates.
Yukon-Koyukuk/Upper Tanana
The Yukon-Koyukuk/Upper Tanana region includes thirty communities. Average 
residential consumption per customer ranges from about 1,500 to almost 5,500 kWh per 
year. Tok and Huslia have the highest consumption levels in the region, while Chakyitsik 
and Manley Host Springs have the lowest levels of consumption. Before PCE, residential 
rates range from 39 cents/kWh to $1.02 per kWh. After PCE, residential rates range 
from 14 to 54 cents per kWh. Chalkyitsik and Takotna pay the highest rates.
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PCE Communities Rates and Consumption
The biggest challenge in providing electricity (and other public services) to rural 
residents lies in the lack of economies of scale; this intractable problem is difficult to 
overcome. The fixed costs associated with running a utility are large and if the number of 
customers and/or levels of consumption are very small these costs must be spread out 
over very few customers and kilowatt-hours. Most PCE communities are similar in that 
they produce all or most of their electricity using diesel generators, have small 
populations, and customers pay electricity rates higher than customers in Anchorage, 
Fairbanks and Juneau. However, across PCE communities there are significant 
differences in remoteness, population sizes (ranging from 8 to about 6,000 people), 
available means for transporting and storing fuel, income and other factors that 
ultimately affect their electricity prices.15 Hence, there is a large variability in electricity 
rates across PCE communities, which in turn, affect their levels of electricity 
consumption.
However, on average, PCE residential customers consume significantly less (over 40%) 
electricity per month than customers in urban areas of Alaska. The average PCE utility 
generates less than 3,000 MWh per year; about 30% of the utilities generate less than 
500 MWh and the smallest generate less than 30,000 kWh per year. By comparison, 
urban utilities (Anchorage and Fairbanks) generate over 1 million MWh per year. This 
means urban utilities produce over 300 times as much power as the average PCE utility. 
Overall, less than 30% of all kWh sold in PCE communities receive PCE credit.
However, the importance of this assistance to residential customers and community 
facilities is significant. As illustrated in Figure 10, in CY2010, almost 70% of all 
residential kilowatt-hours received PCE credit. PCE also provides significant assistance 
to community facilities; Figure 11 shows that of all kilowatt-hours consumed by 
community facilities in CY2010, about 50% received PCE reimbursement.
15 Appendix C lists PCE communities and their residential and effective rates, average 
consumption per residential customer per month, population, average household size (2004), 
average real median income (2004) and average fuel prices in 2009.
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Figure 10: Residential kWh Sold in PCE communities. Source: PCE Annual Statistical Reports 1988­
2010 and author's calculations.
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Figure 11: Community Facilities kWh Sold in PCE Communities. Source: PCE Annual Statistical 
Reports 1988-2010 and author's calculations.
The effect of the PCE program varies across communities depending on the proportion 
residential and community facilities comprise of total utility kWh sales. Figure 12 shows 
kWh sales by customer category by census area. Regions are organized from the 
largest to smallest residential customer share to illustrate the regional differences in 
demand composition by customer categories. It illustrates how in the census areas of
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Hoonah-Angoon or Yukon-Koyukuk among others, residential and community facilities 
sales account for about 50% of total kilowatt-hours sold. In comparison, in census areas 
such as Bristol Bay or North Slope, residential and community facility sales are less than 
about 25% of total kilowatt-hours sold. Most of the regions on the right side of the chart 
with large portions of commercial customer power sales have large fish processing 
operations that have high electricity demands.
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Figure 12: Kilowatt-hours Sold by Customer Category and Census Region. Source: PCE monthly 
program data CY 2010 and author's calculations.
Similarly, Figure 13 shows the proportion of eligible customers by region starting with the 
region with the largest share of eligible customers from left to right. Regions that have 
large industrial sectors also have lower shares of PCE eligible customers.
38
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
■ PCE Eligible Customers ■ Customers Not Eligible for PCE
Figure 13: PCE eligible and non-eligible customers by region, CY 2010. Source: PCE monthly program 
data CY 2010 and author's calculations.
Figure 14 shows both the average residential and effective rates (residential minus PCE 
level). It exemplifies how the PCE program is fairly effective at lowering the effective 
residential rates for the communities served. Those regions (and communities) with 
higher rates receive more relief, while regions with lower rates such as the North Slope, 
receive a lower levels of assistance.16
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Figure 14: Average residential and effective rates o f PCE communities by census region, CY2010.
Source: PCE monthly program data CY 2010 and author's calculations. Averages are weighted.
In most PCE communities average consumption per customer per month is below the 
500 kWh PCE eligibility cap. Table 8 shows the different levels of consumption at 
various rates. During summer months in 2009, less than 18% of eligible communities 
had average consumption levels above the PCE cap. Most of the communities where 
average monthly consumption exceeded the 500 kWh cap were communities that have 
effective rates comparable to those in urban areas (e.g. North Slope16), have 
comparatively high incomes, and/or are located in southeast or southwest Alaska. Even 
during winter, about 60% of the PCE communities did not have average consumption 
above 500 kWh per month per customer only communities with relatively lower rates 
increased their consumption during the winter months (Figure 15).
16 The North Slope Borough communities benefit from availability of natural gas in some of its communities 
and additional subsidies. Rate structure is a flat rate of about 15 cents per kWh for all communities in the 
borough.
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Table 8: Average Consumption per Customer/Month in PCE communities, CY 2009
Calendar Year 2009 - Summer (April-September)
Effective Rate Min Mean Max No. Communities No. Observations
Less than $0.10 203 294 345 0 3
$0.10 -$0.19 107 371 924 57 527
$0.20 - $0.29 113 317 717
486
96 330
$0.30 - $0.39 140 301 9 84
$0.40 - $0.49 182 303 501 5 27
$0.50 - $0.59 69 162 329 2 21
$0.60 - $0.69 115 197 293 2 7
More than $0.70 115 0 1
Calendar Year 2009 - W inter (October - March)
Effective Rate Min Mean Max No. Communities No. Observations
Less than $0.10 324 548 816 1 6
$0.10 -$0.19 100 432 970 49 597
$0.20 - $0.29 92 379 966 101 276
$0.30 - $0.39 144 322 606 10 58
$0.40 - $0.49 148 308 506 7 37
$0.50 - $0.59 53 138 365 2 13
$0.60 - $0.69 81 211 351 2 8
More than $0.70 59 75 91 0 2
Source: PCE monthly program data CY 2009 and author's calculations. Note that the number of 
communities in the summer only adds up to 171 and not 172; this is because not all PCE communities file 
their monthly report year-round. In this case a community only filed during some of the winter months. 
Also the number of communities within a rate range is determined by taking the monthly average for the 
season; hence in some cases it may show a number of observations, but zero communities.
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Figure 15: E lectricity Consumption in PCE Communities by Season, CY 2009. Source: PCE monthly 
program data CY 2009 and author's calculations.
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Chapter 4 Misalignment between PCE and REF
Impacts of PCE on efficiency, innovation and conservation incentives
There are three primary ways that the PCE program ultimately affects the price of 
electricity to rural residents, and thus efficiency, innovation and conservation incentives. 
One is a broad effect on prices and consumption. The second is the specific application 
of the current PCE formula as written in statute and applied by RCA. The third is how the 
savings from integrating lower17 cost renewable resources is distributed among PCE 
eligible kWh, non-eligible kWh and the PCE program. Below each of these effects are 
discussed sequentially in detail.
General Price and Consumption Incentives
The PCE program in its current form has a range of impacts on economic incentives. 
Economic theory tells us that more of a normal good is consumed as prices decline. 
Because PCE lowers the price of electricity for eligible kilowatt-hours, it allows 
customers/households to purchase more electricity and utilities to supply more power 
than they would if they were paying the full market price. However, because the cost of 
producing electricity in most PCE eligible communities is very high, the residential 
customer rates (referred to as the "effective rates”) even with PCE are still relatively very 
high. Comparatively high electricity rates coupled with low cash incomes result in 
average per customer electricity consumption of less than 400 kWh—over 40% less than 
the urban Alaska average of 700 kWh. While residents in PCE communities may be 
consuming more electricity than they would if they were paying market prices, their 
consumption is in the realm of "lifeline” levels barely powering what would be considered 
essential modern household functions such as lights and refrigeration. It appears that 
the primary effect of the PCE program is increasing the quality of life of rural residents 
rather than encouraging "excessive” use of electricity.
On the other hand, by lowering the price of electricity PCE lengthens the payback period 
of household investments for energy efficient products and lowers the energy efficiency 
incentives to households. However, this effect may be outweighed by the relatively high
17 This is not to imply that renewable energy is always a lower cost alternative but rather to 
investigate the effects of the PCE formula if and when renewable energy is a lower cost 
alternative.
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electricity prices households pay even with PCE effective rates. The larger barrier to 
household investments in demand side energy efficiency such as more efficient 
appliances and lighting is likely insufficient household income and capital to finance the 
upfront costs of these investments. An increase in residential energy efficiency does not 
necessarily result in utilities have to cope with lower electricity demand because these 
household efficiency gains may allow households to increase consumption over time, 
thus becoming more likely to reach parity with urban household consumption levels, and 
increasing rural quality of life.
At the utility level, there are generation efficiency and line loss standards that must be 
met in order to receive the full potential PCE level. If these generation efficiency 
standards are not met, the PCE level is lowered. In addition, utilities submit detailed 
documentation regarding their operating costs and RCA determines if costs are eligible. 
Yet, the reporting complexity and limited resources of some utilities may result in 
detailed operational data not being updated frequently, resulting in PCE levels being 
lower than necessary to cover actual utility costs.18
Utility generation standards provide a disincentive to generate at lower efficiencies. 
However, adjustments in the PCE effective rate calculations are complex and utility 
clerks and rate payers may not fully realize that they have forgone a portion of the PCE 
payment because the utility is generating power less efficiently than the standards19. 
There are also a myriad of causes of poor efficiency including old generators20, 
generators poorly sized for the load, failing transmission lines and transformers, deferred 
and insufficient maintenance, lack of operator training, and loads that are too small to 
support a central generating facility, all of which are difficult for small cash strapped 
utilities to control or address. The Alaska Energy Authority (AEA) and other institutional 
support have improved this situation generally, but the needs and issues are so diverse 
and complex that it is difficult to see how it can be fully overcome.
18 Work with some rural utilities on their cost structures and limited review of PCE non-fuel cost 
data suggest that this issue is not uncommon.
19 Utility clerk positions in rural utilities tend to have very high turn-over issues. Hence maintaining 
a well trained utility clerk that fully understands the complexities of the PCE reporting 
requirements and the consequences of not filing accurate information is an important and
continuous challenge.
20 Data published by the U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration suggests 
that internal combustion generators in Alaska are about seventeen and a half years old.
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Probably the most significant incentive utilities have to operate as efficiently as possible 
is the fact that for most utilities, PCE eligible kWh are less than half of the total kWh sold. 
So a significant number of their customers are paying the full rate for all (commercial and 
other) or a portion of their kWh consumption (residential and community facilities). In 
many cases, the cost to self-generate for their commercial customers may be similar to 
the rates these customers are paying the utility. So the utilities are under substantial 
pressure to keep their rates as low as possible because losing commercial customers is 
likely to send the utility into a downward spiral of escalating costs and declining sales 
over which to spread the costs, along with declining generation efficiency as the load 
decreases. From the utility perspective, this results in disincentives to have either 
individuals or commercial customers self generate, generate renewably, or decrease 
their load through efficiency or conservation.
In summary, while PCE reduces the rates paid for eligible kWh, for most residential 
customers the effective rates are still sufficiently high and household cash incomes 
sufficiently low such that most customers continue to consume have electricity use. Low 
income and high energy costs coupled with volatile fossil fuel prices and the fiscal 
challenges of fully funding the PCE program, results in a high level of "energy insecurity” 
in most rural communities. The PCE data show that average per residential customer 
consumptions is well under the cap of 500 kWh. The fact that average consumption is 
lower than the allowable cap illustrates a degree of uncertainty by residential customers 
regarding if and how much reimbursement they will actually receive. For utilities, 
pressure from customers paying non-PCE rates probably overwhelms any effect that 
PCE may have on reducing the incentive to maximize generation efficiency. While the 
high cost of electricity may overwhelm the disincentives caused by the PCE funding 
formula, the PCE program does not address the fundamental barriers to improving 
energy efficiency and saving rate payers money in rural communities.
However, the PCE funding formula structure does result in a disincentive towards 
innovation and alternate sources of energy as potential solutions to the problem of high 
costs of rural energy because it is directly tied to fuel costs. As a result, integrating 
alternative or renewable generation technologies may result in a lower PCE payment 
causing the effective electric rates to increase. Knowing how the PCE level will change 
requires an individual analysis for each utility and generation alternative because
45
alternative sources of generation affect non-fuel costs (which are also considered in the 
PCE formula), hence the PCE level may increase, decrease or remain the same. In 
other words, the new PCE level depends on how the utility cost structure changes and 
by how much. Considering the impact of PCE is highly situation specific and hence 
difficult to predict.
Fuel Cost Calculations
A decline in fuel costs affects the PCE level calculations because in the formula the total 
fuel costs are divided by all kilowatt-hours sold, not just the kilowatts-hours sold that 
were generated using diesel fuel. Table 9 shows a generic example of how dividing fuel 
costs by total kWh sold results in a decrease in the fuel cost variable used in the PCE 
level formula. Hence the way fuel costs are calculated in the PCE formula becomes a 
disincentive against integrating renewable generation and also increasing the 
penetration of renewable power generation. This results because the larger the 
renewable generation, the lower the fuel cost per kWh that is used in the PCE formula to 
calculate the PCE level. The simplified examples below should help to clarify this 
complexity.
Table 9: Example o f PCE Fuel Costs Calculations and Its Effects on Renewable Generation
Generation from  diesel, 100% Generation from diesel, 50%
Total fuel costs $1,000 Total fuel costs $500
Total kWh sold from diesel 10,000 Total kWh sold from diesel 5,000
Total kWh sold 10,000 Total kWh sold 10,000
Fuel costs/kWh sold from diesel $0.10 Fuel costs/kWh sold from diesel $0.10
Fuel costs/total kWh sold $0.10 Fuel costs/total kWh sold $0.05
Source: Author's calculations.
In order to illustrate how the effect of reduced fuel cost could decrease the PCE level 
and lead to higher effective rates for residential customers; two generic scenarios of 
renewable integration based on PCE program data are presented below (Figure 16). 
These scenarios present a review of the differences in the rate calculations between 
generating all electricity with diesel with generating electricity with a hybrid diesel- 
renewables system. The first scenario reviews the changes for a utility with high 
renewable penetration using hydroelectric generation. The second scenario reviews the
46
changes for a utility with low renewable penetration using wind generation. However, the 
type of renewable generation is immaterial to the results.
Scenario 1 Scenario 2
Diesel Only Diesel-Hydro Diesel Only Diesel-Wind
Generation
Renewables generation, kWh 0 1,507,416 (90%) 0 341,956 (9%)
Diesel generation, kWh 1,682,428 (100%) 175,012 (10%) 3,866,416 (100%) 3,524,460 (91%)
Total generation, kWh 1,682,428 1,682,428 3,866,416 3,866,416
Total kWh Sold 1,454,633 1,454,633 3,646,178 3,646,178
Costs
Total fuel consumed, gallons 89,307 9,290 288,771 263,231
Average fuel price, $/gallon 2.31 2.31 2.63 2.63
Total fuel costs, $ 206,045 21,434 758,991 691,864
Fuel cost per kWh Sold, $/kWh 0.14 (27%) 0.01 (4%) 0.21 (54%) 0.19 (51%)
Non-fuel costs, $ 542,128 542,128 641,935 751,320
Non-fuel cost per kWh sold, $/kWh 0.37 (73%) 0.37 (96%) 0.18 (46%) 0.21 (49%)
PCE Calculations
Total costs per kWh, $/kWh 0.51 0.39 0.38 0.40
Base rate, $/kWh 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13
PCE eligible costs, $/kWh 0.38 0.26 0.25 0.26
Funding Level, $/kWh 95% 95% 95% 95%
PCE level, $/kWh 0.36 0.24 0.24 0.25
Rates
Residential rate, $/kWh 0.52 0.52 0.43 0.43
-PCE level, $/kWh 0.36 0.24 0.24 0.25
Effective rate, $/kWh 0.16 0.28 0.19 0.18
Figure16: Sample PCE Level Calculation Before and After Integrating Renewables. Source: PCE 
monthly program data CY 2009 and author's calculations.
In both scenarios total generation, total kWh sold, average fuel price and residential 
rates are assumed constant. Though these factors may likely change, however keeping 
them constant clearly illustrates the effect of fuel costs in the current PCE level formula. 
In the first scenario we assume that non-fuel costs remain the same (though this is
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unlikely in any renewable energy system21); and in the second scenario non-fuel costs 
are increased at 3 cents per kilowatt-hour. Figure 16 shows the calculations of the PCE 
level for both scenarios.
Scenario 1 shows a PCE utility moving from generating all electricity with diesel to 
having a high renewable penetration hybrid system of 90% hydroelectric and 10% diesel 
generation. This change leads to a decrease in fuel costs by 90%. Consequently, their 
total cost per kWh drops and so does the PCE level, by about 33%. The result is an 
increase in the residential effective rate from 16 cents/kWh to 28 cents/kWh (about 
75%).
Scenario 2 shows a PCE utility moving from generating all electricity with diesel to 
having a low renewable penetration hybrid system of 9% wind and 91% diesel 
generation. This change leads to a decrease in fuel costs of about 9%. In this scenario, 
we assumed an increase in non-fuel costs of 3 cents per kWh sold and this leads to an 
increase of 17% in total non-fuel costs. After the decrease in fuel costs and the increase 
in non-fuel costs, the total cost per kWh increases 2 cents/kWh and the PCE level 
increases 1 cent/kWh. Consequently, although the residential effective rate ($0.18) 
decreases 1 cent/kWh (from $0.19 in the diesel only column), this decrease in the 
effective rate would have been larger if the fuel cost/kWh calculation in the PCE formula 
had only been done using kWh sold that were generated with diesel and not all kWh 
sold. This formula designed may be a reflection of the time when the formula was 
developed when it was assumed all generation would be done with diesel fuel. If fuel 
costs per kWh were calculated based only on the kWh sold generated with diesel, the 
fuel costs per kWh would have remained constant. Under this alternative application of 
the formula, residential customers would have seen a 17% decrease in their effective 
rate.
This uncertainty regarding the impact on the resulting PCE level may be a disincentive 
against seeking renewable sources of generation. If integrating renewable energy 
sources results in comparable or lower costs, this results in a clear benefit to the utility 
and community as a whole. Figure 17 illustrates the effects the residential customer may 
see in their monthly bill under the two scenarios discussed above. If these customers do
21 Both fuel cost and non fuel cost change when the renewable energy is integrated into the 
generating system which change is larger and determines the effect on rates can only be 
determined in a case by case basis.
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not realize monthly savings on their bills, a "public relations” problem is likely to result for 
the utility. Customers focus on their monthly bills—not the price per kWh, not their total 
monthly consumption, not the PCE funding formula, nor other factors but except what 
they must pay each month. An expected rational reaction of utilities would be to further 
increase non-fuel costs beyond the actual added costs from renewable energy 
integration to help offset the inaccurately large calculated decrease in the fuel costs 
portion of the formula.
Scenario 1 Scenario 2
Diesel Only Diesel-Wind
No PCE PCE No PCE PCE
Residential Rate, $/kWh $ 0.43 $ 0.19 $ 0.43 $ 0.18
Monthly Bill @ 400 kwh per month, $/month $ 172 $ 76 $ 172 $ 72
Monthly Bill @ 600 kWh per month, $/month $ 258 $ 138 $ 258 $ 133
Figure 17: Example o f Effects on Customers' Bills from  Integrating Renewables. Source: PCE monthly 
program data CY 2009 and author's calculations.
Distribution o f Renewable Energy Savings
If the PCE level declines causing the effective residential rates to increase for PCE 
eligible kWh, PCE eligible rate payers consuming below the 500 kWh cap see little 
benefit on their monthly bills because the savings accrue to the PCE program, not the 
rate payer. Alternatively, if the PCE level remains the same, these same customers still 
see no change in their monthly bills. If the PCE level increases, the effective rate 
marginally decline providing some decrease to customer bills. But the latter only occurs 
if the renewable generation is more expensive than diesel fuel generation, which is 
counter to the purpose of integrating renewables and should not happen.
Preliminary estimates of rate effects of the renewable energy grant funded projects on 
effective PCE rates showed the proportion of savings to PCE eligible ratepayers was 
about 1-2% with the remainder of savings split between PCE ineligible ratepayers and 
the PCE program.22 This preliminary estimate (Table 10) is consistent with the estimates 
shown in example Scenario 1 (above in Figure 16). Table 10 provides a summary 
example of the savings distributions from integrating renewable energy generation
22 Alaska Energy Authority, calculations for the Renewable Energy Fund Grant program review, 
January 2012.
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based on scenario 1 above. This example uses FY 10 PCE data to calculate the specific 
saving distributions across different classes of rate payers and the PCE program.
Table 10: Example o f PCE Savings D istribution from Integrating Renewables
Scenario 1- Diesel-Hydroelectric
For eligible customers (48% o f all kWh sold)
Savings
distribution
Production cost savings/kWh $0.12
PCE eligible kWh 692,489
PCE program savings/kWh (based on 95%covered by PCE program) $0,118
Total PCE program savings $81,798 45%
Customer savings (based on 5% not covered by PCE program) $0,006
Total eligible customer savings $4,305 2%
For non-eligible customers, 100% savings (52% o f all kWh sold)
Non-eligible customers' savings/kWh $0.12
Total non-eligible kWh 762,144
Total non-eligible customer savings $94,763 53%
Total production savings from renewable energy integration $180,866
Source: PCE monthly program data CY 2009 and author's calculations.
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Chapter 5 Measuring the Price Elasticity of Demand in PCE Communities
As policy makers consider options to tackle policy reform and make programmatic 
structure changes regarding electricity rates, it is critically important to understand how 
potential modifications may change rates and consumption patterns. Price and income 
elasticity of demand are very important when formulating or re-structuring pricing policies 
(Narayan & Smyth, 2005). Economic theory tells us that in most cases prices and 
consumption have an indirect relationship meaning more of a good is consumed when 
prices are relatively lower and less of a good is consumed when prices are relatively 
higher. The economic concept of Price Elasticity of Demand (PED) measures the 
proportionate change in quantity consumed of a good in response to a proportionate 
change in the good’s own price (Nicholson & Snyder, 2008).
Traditionally, economists have used econometric methods to estimate the price elasticity 
of goods (Dilaver & Hunt, 2011; Khank & Qayyum, 2009; Narayan & Smyth, 2005).
While there are a number of elasticity estimates for other regions of the nation Alaska 
specific price elasticity estimates for rural communities have not been developed. 
Because of its importance related to analyzing price structural reforms, this chapter 
presents a preliminary effort to measure PED in PCE communities in Alaska.
Model
Consumer demand theory provides a general framework to understand demand of 
goods and services. Consumers have the willingness and ability to purchase a range of 
quantities of a good given a range of prices. In a consumer demand model price, 
income, taste and preferences, and the prices of substitute and complementary goods 
affect quantity demanded (Nicholson & Snyder, 2008). Economists have produced a 
vast literature specifically on what are the electricity of demand factors; namely 
household electricity consumption is understood to be a function of the price of 
electricity, household income, consumer appliances and the rate at which they are used, 
number of users/customers, ambient temperature and seasonality (affecting the use of 
heating/cooling and need for lighting) (Narayan & Smyth, 2005).
For the purpose of this study, residential customer monthly electricity demand in a PCE 
community is assumed to be represented by:
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ECt = f (R, I, P, S)t (1)
where at time t, EC is the average quantity of electricity demanded as a function of R 
the price of electricity, I the household income, P the community population, and S as 
the changes in consumption due to seasonal factors.
The model does not differentiate between long-run and short-run, hence implicitly the 
model presented analyzes the short-run where household’s electrical appliances and 
income are fixed, and all customers are homogeneous.
In econometrics, log-log models are commonly used to measure elasticity (Wooldridge,
2009). It is called a log-log model because the natural logarithms of the both the 
independent and dependent variables are used to estimate the percentage change of 
the dependent variable (consumption) based on the percentage change of the 
independent variable (price or rates). In order to estimate Alaska’s PED of electricity for 
residential customers, regression analysis of a log-log model was used.
The estimated econometric model used is specified as follows:
In RKCi t  = Po  + P i  In RKC( i t - i )  + P2  In Ri t  + P4  In R( i t - i )  + Ps  In Yt  + P7  Wi t  (2)
+ P8 P500 it + P9  P io o o it  + P i o  P2 0 0 0 it  + U
where:
RKC represents the average monthly residential kilowatt-hours consumed per customer 
in community i
R represents the average monthly effective rate (residential rate -  PCE rate) for 
community i
Y represents the fixed (CY 2004) real (2010$) average adjusted gross income for 
community i
W is a dummy variable indicating seasonality; where winter (October-March) equals one 
summer, and (April-September) equals zero.
P500 dummy variable equal to one for communities with populations between 201 and 
500 people, zero otherwise.
P1000 dummy variable equal to one for communities with populations between 501 and 
1000 people, zero otherwise.
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P20 0 0 dummy variable equal to one for communities with populations between 1001 
people, zero otherwise.
P represents the estimated coefficient for each covariate 
i  represents an observation for community 
t  represents one time period
Methods
An Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ADL) Model was chosen to improve estimation 
accuracy as the data panel presented serial correlation. ADL models fall under the 
category of the econometric modern view of time series data that uses specifications to 
capture dynamic processes in the question rather than view serial correlation as a 
technical OLS assumption violation. ADL models include lagged dependent and 
independent variables in the model. Autoregressive refers to the inclusion of lagged 
dependent variables which results in making the effect from the previous period persist 
by having the impact of the unit level from the previous period added to the unit level 
change in the current period; and eventually the effect will disappear. Distributed lag 
refers to the inclusion of lagged independent variables to try to capture the explanatory 
value of past values of the explanatory variable. (Golder, n.d.).
The model appropriately incorporates factors such as price and income, a dummy 
variable w inter to capture seasonality effects, and a set of dummy variables indicating 
the differences in size of the population to capture consumption effects due to difference 
in community size.
However, the fact that the model does not differentiate between short and long run is a 
critical consideration because based on economic literature we know that "short-run 
elasticities are much smaller than long-run elasticities” (Narayan & Smyth, 2005). 
Changing price structures have long term implications, we should expect that in the long 
run changes in consumption would be likely and considerably higher than those in the 
short term.
Measuring PED of electricity for rural Alaska communities is particularly challenging 
because the prices/ rates of residential customers are subsidized by the PCE program -  
the first 500 kWh per customer per month are a significantly lower rate than any 
consumption above the cap. Hence the demand curve is discontinuous. This not only
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means that different rates are paid for different levels of consumption but that consumer 
behavior factors this two different prices into their purchasing patterns—meaning that the 
higher price above the cap affects consumption for the kWh below the cap and that kWh 
consumed above the cap are affected by the consumption and prices below the cap. In 
most communities, there is a large discontinuity between the prices above the cap, 
which are much higher than the prices below the cap. Most residential customers 
consume below the cap (presented in Chapter 3).
Measuring the subsidy effect is exceptionally difficult because the program has existed 
for almost 30 years and no data is available prior to the program’s existence and 
because all residential customers served in a community that is eligible for PCE receive 
the subsidy so there is no comparison group. Due to data limitations the model 
presented does not account for the discontinuity of the pricing structure and two way 
relationships the subsidy creates among both pricing structures. For the purpose of this 
research the elasticities are measured with respect to the price customers are currently 
paying for electricity -  the effective rate -  which is defined as the residential rate minus 
the PCE level (subsidy amount). Nonetheless, understanding and measuring PED of 
electricity is indispensable for researchers and policy makers as policy reforms are 
considered and using a less complex model still provided valuable analytical information. 
In order to estimate PED of electricity in PCE communities, a dataset was created with 
price and consumption data as wells as data regarding communities’ characteristics 
such as income, average household size and seasons. This dataset was then converted 
to a STATA format (a statistical software package) and missing data points were 
imputed23. In addition, based on the variable month a new dummy variable was created 
called winter. For the winter variable, the value of zero was given to all observations 
with months from April to September and the value of one to all observations with 
months from October to March. The final dataset used in the model is an unbalanced
23
The STATA ‘impute’ command was used. Missing values of the dependent variable (variable 
being imputed) are computed based on a list of variables (independent variables). For example, 
the missing values for average residential kWh consumption were imputed based on population, 
census region, month, amount of diesel generation and residential rate. For the residential kWh 
consumption (1 7 3 /1 8 6 4 7 ) observations and for residential rate (2 3 / 1 8 6 4 7 ) observations were 
missing a careful review of the summary statistics of both original and imputed variable was 
performed to verify that the range and distribution of values were of as similar as possible.
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panel for PCE communities with price, consumption monthly data from CY2002 to 
CY2010, and other community characteristics.
Descriptive statistics were run for all variables as well as statistical tests to determine 
presence of muticollinearity24, serial correlation,25 heteroskedasticity26 and whether fixed 
or random effects should be used in the panel data analysis. Data sources and results 
are described below.
Data Sources 
PCE Program Data
The Alaska Energy Authority uses a proprietary database system called NAVSION 
where data collected from the Monthly Utility Reports are stored and financial and 
disbursement data are tracked. Data from the PCE NAVISION system is available from 
2002 to present. This database includes variables such as sales, customers, residential 
and PCE rates among many other variables at the utility/community and monthly level. 
Hence, pricing, customer and consumption data are sourced from the PCE program data 
system. Having monthly data available helps improve estimates of Alaska’s PED of 
electricity. On the other hand, because the data is aggregated at the community level 
and not available at the customer level, it limits the estimates interpretative value. Data 
availability is the primary reason why the PED model uses data at the community level 
and not at the customer level which would be more desirable.
PCE Data Quality
PCE program data collected through the PCE Monthly Reports is self reported by the 
utility. Variables such as residential and PCE electric rates, disbursements, number of 
customers and kilowatt-hours sold are of higher quality than other variables in the 
database. This information is reviewed by AEA staff against documentation submitted by 
the utility. Variables such as fuel and non-fuels costs, generation and others are not
24 Multicollinearity refers to high correlation among independent variables in a multiple regression 
model.25
In a time series or panel data model serial correlation means correlation between the errors in 
different time periods.
26 Heteroskedasticity means that the variance of the error term given the explanatory variables is 
not constant.
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reviewed to the same level of scrutiny because they are not relevant to providing the 
disbursement to the utility and because that information is more carefully reviewed by 
the RCA. Because these agencies operate independently and no formal mechanisms 
exist to reconcile data submitted by the utilities to both agencies, data discrepancies are 
unfortunately common. PCE program data from AEA is more readily available and 
accessible than data from RCA. Fortunately, the variables used in the model are of 
relatively higher quality.
Other Sources
Because factors other than price also have significant effects in the levels of 
consumption of residential customers, an econometric model should control for as many 
of this factors as possible. Commonly these factors include income, household size, 
temperature, population, and prices of household appliances among others. However, in 
practice as a result of data constraints, most studies fall short of the comprehensive 
empirical specification; typically electricity consumption is represented as a function of 
price, income, population and temperature (Narayan & Smyth, 2005).
Public data regarding residents or demographics of rural Alaska communities is scarce, 
and even when data is available, data quality needed for statistical analysis is even more 
difficult to find.
Income is a critical variable when estimating PED. The U.S. Census Bureau collects and 
publishes many demographic data on Alaska communities including income and 
household size. However, data regarding income in Alaska communities is published in 
the America Community Survey (ACS) and only at the 5 year-average, the most recent 
being 2005-2009. Though ACS data allows to have data for each community, it creates 
limitations in the model because not only is it not monthly data like PCE consumption 
and pricing data but it is a five year average which may introduce measurement bias. 
Additionally, due to small sample size issues, ACS data has very large margins of error 
which are problematic and further hinder their usefulness in the model.
In 2008, the Institute of Social and Economic Research at the University of Alaska, 
Anchorage in partnership with the Center for Economic Development and others 
conducted a study researching types of small business enterprises that might be viable 
in different sizes and types of rural Alaska communities -  the Viable Business
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Enterprises for Rural Alaska (ViBEs) project. As part of this study, a database was 
created with includes IRS zip code level data for average adjusted gross income27, 
aggregated at the community level. However, the data is only available for one year, tax 
year 2004, and is six years older than the most recent year of study in this analysis 
(2010). Nonetheless, because the income data is of critical importance, the average 
adjusted gross income data from the IRS zip code level data as aggregated and 
published by ISER was used in this model because it is more reliable for the purpose of 
this analysis than the median income data published by the U.S. Census Bureau-ACS. 
This means that in the regression dataset the variables of average adjusted gross 
income variable is fixed for a community over the time period of analysis. Both ACS and 
ViBES databases also includes data for total number of households and average 
household size (originally published from the U.S. Census Bureau). The average 
household size variable has a small range of 2 to 5 and very little variation across all 
observations limiting its usefulness in regression analysis. Hence instead, U.S. Census 
Bureau population estimates data published by the Alaska Department of Labor and 
Workforce Development was used in the model introduced as a set of dummy variables. 
In summary, data constraints limits the reliability of the model presented that can be 
overcome as additional and more disaggregated data becomes available that allows a 
more accurate estimation of the specified model. These factors however do not diminish 
the importance of the valuable insight that the model discussed below provides and how 
it improves the knowledge base regarding electricity pricing and consumption effects in 
rural Alaska.
Results
Diagnostic Tests
Prior to estimating the regression described above a number of statistical tests were 
performed to determine the appropriateness of the model. Below (Table 11) a
27
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) publishes household income data at the zip code level 
including for many Alaska communities. An effort was made to collect recent income data from 
the IRS, but at the time this analysis was conducted the IRS did not have the data available and 
neither an expected date when the data may become available.
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description of these statistical tests is presented, starting with the descriptive statistics of 
variables of interest in the database.
Table 11: Variable Descriptive Statistics
Variable Descriptive Statistics
N=18647
Standard
DeviationVariable Name Range Mean
Real residential rate (imputed) (0.15, 1.98) 0.512 0.162
Real effective rate (0.05, 1.20) 0.249 0.091
Residential kWh per month (757, 1,210,865) 65,759 122,082
Residential kWh per customer per month (29, 5113) 365 132
ReaI average adjusted gross income
(VIBES/IRS CY2004, imputed) (9,889, 64,115) 26,760 8,172
Average household size
(VIBES/ACS CY2004, imputed) (2, 5) 3.6 0.737
TotaTpopulation  (8," 6,080) 451 715
The range of variables presented in this table (Table 11) provides a clear example of 
how differences across communities can be extremely large in all aspects, from 
population, income, prices and consumption. Although PCE communities share many 
essential challenges, they are also clearly diverse.
In addition to a review of the variables descriptive statistics, an examination of the 
correlation among variables used in the regression was performed and collinearity 
diagnostics were reviewed to examine potential presence of multicollinearity. Given the 
results of the test presented in Table 12, muticollinearity was not a concern when 
estimating the model.
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Table 12: Collinearity Diagnostic Results
Collinearity Diagnostics
SQRT R-
Variable VIF VIF Tolerance Squared
ln R 1.06 1.03 0.9478 0.0522
In Y 1.20 1.10 0.8305 0.1695
W 1.00 1.00 0.9998 0.0002
P500 1.21 1.10 0.825 0.175
P1000 1.24 1.11 0.8078 0.1922
P2000 1.30 1.14 0.7672 0.2328
Mean VIF 1.01
Eigenval
Cond
Index
1 4.1921 1.0000
1.0007 2.0468
2 1.0000 2.0475
3 0.4666 2.9974
4 0.3067 3.6969
5 0.0335 11.1887
6 0.0003 110.7562
7
Condition Number 110.7562
Eigenvalues & Cond Index computed from scaled raw sscp (w/intercept) 
Det (correlation matrix) 0.6446
Additionally, to the determine whether the panel presented serial correlation a 
Wooldridge test for panel data as executed in STATA was performed. The test 
hypothesis is that no firs-order autocorrelation exists. The test however proved 
significant at the 1% level leading to a rejection of the null hypothesis and a conclusion 
that the panel data presented autocorrelation (Table 13).
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Table 13: Autocorrelation Test Results
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data
Ho: no first-order autocorrelation
F(1, 176) = 56.539
Prob>F = 0.0000
Given that the data presented autocorrelation, the dataset was tested for stationarity with 
a Fisher Test for panel unit root using an augmented Dickey-Fuller test. The test 
hypothesis is that a unit root exists. The test results (Table 14) were significant at the 1% 
level leading to a rejection of the null hypothesis and a conclusion that the data did not 
have a unit root.
Table 14: Stationarity Test Results
Fisher Test for panel unit root using an 
augmented Dickey-Fuller test (1)
Ho: unit root
"" Chi2(354) =" 27912487"" "
"" Prob > Chi2 =" 0.0000 ""
Moreover, to determine whether fixed or random effects should be used in the model 
estimation a Hausman specification test was performed. The process of this test is that 
estimates for the specified models are calculated under fixed effects and the 
assumptions that the estimated parameters are consistent under both the null and 
alternative hypothesis. Then estimates for the specified model are calculated under 
random effects and the assumptions that the estimated parameters are inconsistent 
under the alternative hypothesis but efficient under the null hypothesis. Finally a 
Hausman test is done for the null hypothesis that the difference in coefficients is not 
systematic. The test was significant at the 1% level hence rejecting the null hypothesis 
and concluding that fixed effects are more appropriate for this model (Table 15). By 
using fixed effects the unobserved effect is allowed to be arbitrarily correlated with the 
explanatory variables in each time period. Fixed effects allows the relationship between
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predictor and outcome to be explored within an entity (e.g. community) as each entity 
has its own individual characteristics that may or may not influence the predictor 
variables. By using fixed effects, it is assumed that something within the community may 
impact or bias the predictor or outcome variables and we need to control for this.
Table 15. Fixed or Random Effects Test
Hausman Specification Test
Coefficients-
(b) (B) (b-B) sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
Variable Fixed Random Difference S.E.
ln RKC(t-1) 0.4645295 0.8066271 -0.3420977 0.0046319
In R -0.0334138 -0.4113124 0.0078986
In R(t-i) -0.0171829 -0.131211 -0.0040618
In Y 0.1238014 0.0381254 0.085676 0.016682
W 0.1047754 0.0614583 0.0433171
P500 0.0120607 0.0549379 -0.0428772 0.0097884
P1000 0.0393692 0.0624882 -0.0231189 0.0165689
P2000 0.0702155 0.0729332 -0.0027177 0.0317757
b=consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg 
B=inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
chi2(5) = (b-B) ' [ (V_b-V_B) A -1 ] (b-B)
= 5747.86
Prob>chi2 = 0.0000
(V_b-V_B is not positive definite)
Finally, the dataset was also tested for presence of heteroskedasticity using a modified 
Wald test for groupwise heteroskedasticity in fixed effect regression model. The null 
hypothesis is that homoskedasticity exist. The test was significant at the 1% level hence 
rejecting the null hypothesis and concluding that heteroskedasticity exists (Table 16). 
Consequently, robust standard errors are reported for the model estimation.
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Modified Wald test for groupwise 
heteroskedasticity in fixed effect regression model
Table 16. Heteroskedasticity Test
Ho: sigma(i)A2=sigmaA2 for all i
Chi2 (177) = 5684.16
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Regression Results
The model estimates residential kilowatt-consumption per customer at a rural village as 
a function of the real effective rate customers pay, the average real adjusted gross 
income in a village (fixed), the difference in consumption from the prior month, a lagging 
consumption effect from the previous period, a lagged price effect from the previous 
period, changes in consumption due to seasonality and community population size. 
Table 17 (page 60) shows the regression estimation output.
All variables in the model are statistically significant with the exception of the P500 
variable. Introducing the lagged residential consumption per customer in the model has 
the purpose of addressing serial correlation in the data. It accounts for shocks in 
unmeasured variables that have a long term impact on residential consumption per 
customer per month. The effect of these unmeasured variables persists over time but 
the effect of measured variables does not persist. The variable is significant meaning 
these shocks exist and they have a positive relationship with consumption; in other 
words they increase residential kWh consumption per customer per month. However, 
these effects disappear over time.
As expected, the price elasticity of demand is negative and highly inelastic. A 1% 
increase in the real effective price results in a 0.03% decrease in residential kWh 
consumption per customer per month. In addition, the lagged real effective rate from 2 
time periods past have a negative effect in the residential kWh consumption per 
customer per month consumed in the present time. For example a real effective rate 
increase has the effect of decreasing consumption in two time periods later, but at a 
diminishing rate.
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Table 17: Regression Output
Regression Output
Fixed-effects (within) regression Number of observations = 18318
Group variable: featureid Number of groups = 177
R-squared: within: 0.3902
between: 0.9453 Obs per group: min = 12
overall: = 0.7572 avg = 103.5
max = 113
F (5, 176) = 379.34
corr ( u_i,Xb) = 0.7270 Prob > F = 0.0000
Robust
Standard
ln RKC Coefficient Error t P >l t | [95% Confidence Interval]
In RKC(t- 1) 0.4645295 0.0256469 18.11 0.000 0.4139145 0.5151445
In R -0.0334138 0.0095676 -3.49 0.001 -0.0522959 -0.0145318
In R(t-i) -0.0171829 0.009876 -1.74 0.084 -0.0366736 0.0023077
In Y 0.1238014 0.0409927 3.02 0.003 0.042901 0.2047018
W 0.1047754 0.0082766 12.66 0.000 0.0884412 0.1211096
P500 0.0120607 0.0147967 0.82 0.416 -0.0171411 0.0412626
P1000 0.0393692 0.0218759 1.8 0.074 -0.0038036 0.082542
P2000 0.0702155 0.0219741 3.2 0.002 0.0268488 0.1135822
13o (constant) 1.725982 0.4502192 3.83 0.000 0.8374588 2.614505
sigma_u 0.15425644
sigma_e 0.14797145
rho 0.52078654 (fraction of variance due to u_i)
Also as anticipated, income price elasticity is positive but also inelastic. A 1% increase in 
the real average adjusted gross income in a community results in an increase of 0.12% 
increase in residential kWh consumption per customer per month. Increases in income 
shift the demand curve to the right.
Seasons are also an important factor. The difference in residential kWh consumption per 
customer per month due to seasonal changes is significant. The regression results 
indicate that residential customers consume 11.05% more kWh per month during the 
winter; and so the demand curve shifts to the right during the winter months.
63
Differences in the community size also have explanatory value. Communities with 
populations between 201 and 500 people consume about 1.21% more than small 
communities with population sizes of 200 people or less. However, this difference did not 
show to be statistically significant. On the other hand, communities with populations 
between 501 and 1000 people consume about 4.02% more than small communities with 
population sizes of 200 people or less. This difference showed to be statistically 
significant at less than the 10% level. Finally, communities with populations of more than 
1001 people consume about 7.27% more than small communities with population sizes 
of 200 people or less. This difference showed to be statistically significant at the 1% 
level.
In this model the constant (p0) represents the changes in residential kWh consumption 
per customer per month when there is no change in any of the factors specified in the 
model. Because the regression is based on a log-log model that means that the 
logarithm of consumption is equal to 1.75. Hence in if there is no change in the specified 
variables residential kWh consumption per customer per month is equal to eA1.75 « 6 
kilowatt-hours effectively a very small amount.
As estimated by the model described above, price elasticity of demand for electricity in 
PCE communities is as anticipated and consistent with the literature (Table 18), negative 
and inelastic.
Unlike the examples presented in Table 18, the estimated PED for PCE communities is 
highly inelastic, in fact almost perfectly inelastic (-0.03). Hence, any change in price will 
not result in to a substantial change in the average level of consumption per customer.
It may be that the price elasticity for electricity may appear to be so inelastic for PCE 
communities because not only there is a lack of substitutes for (or lack or alternative 
sources to produce) electricity among this communities but also because the majority of 
these communities are consuming electricity at minimum levels and their ability to 
reduce consumption if price increase is limited; so instead their consumption of other 
goods may be sacrificed to maintain the existing level of electricity consumption.
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Table 18: Examples o f Residential Price Elasticity o f Demand fo r E lectricity in the Literature
Title Location Description28 PED Findings
The demand for electricity in 
Pakistan
(Khank & Qayyum, 2009)
Pakistan Examines aggregate and 
household electricity demand; 
short-run and long-run price 
elasticities.
PED negative and 
inelastic.
Short-run (-0.167) 
Long-run (-0.25)
Turkish aggregate electricity 
demand: an outlook to 2020 
(Dilaver & Hunt, 2011)
Turkey Investigates Turkish aggregate 
electricity demand.
PED negative and 
inelastic. (-0.11)
The residential demand for electricity 
in Australia: an application of the 
bounds of testing approach to 
cointegration 
(Narayan & Smyth, 2005)
Australia Estimates residential electricity 
demand; short-run and long-run 
price elasticities .
PED negative and 
inelastic.
Short-run (-0.541) 
Long-run (-0.263)
The short-run residential demand for 
electricity
(Barnes, Gillingham, & Robert, 1981)
U.S. Estimates short-run price elasticity 
of residential demand for 
electricity. (In-depth analysis by 
end-use)
PED negative and 
inelastic.
Overall (-0.55)
Alternatively, it may be that if prices decrease PCE residential customers are not able to 
significantly increase their consumption due to the inflexibility and strong effects of other 
constraints such as low incomes, aging or inadequate infrastructure and limited stock 
and low use rate of electrical appliances. PED findings at the aggregate level in the 
Khank & Qayyum study implied electricity to be a necessity for the urban population but 
a luxury good for the rural population (2009). It’s possible that a similar phenomenon 
may be true for PCE residents where although electricity may not necessarily be luxury 
good, nonetheless it may require significant increases in disposable income to drive 
higher consumption of electricity as electricity competes with other essential goods for 
the household income.
Below Table 19, presents examples of expected average change in average 
consumption per customer in the short run for a selected group of communities if prices 
were to equalize to the average urban rates of about 14 cents/kWh given the estimated
28 These descriptions are narrow summaries that are only concerned with the aspects of the 
research that are being compared in this table and not the comprehensive research questions of 
the authors.
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price elasticity of demand of 0.03%; despite large decreases in prices, changes in 
consumption are minimal.
Table 19: Expected Consumption fo r Selected Communities
Community
Name
Effective Rate Mean Consumption Change in Price Expected Consumption
in CY 2010 in CY 2010
cents/kWh kWh per customer percent kWh per customer
Allakaket 19.5 244 -39% 247
Bethel 17.9 510 -28% 514
Lime Village 94 87 -571% 102
Hoonah 20.4 412 -46% 418
Saint Mary's 31.1 383 -122% 397
Some important policy implications of the price elasticity being so highly inelastic are that 
electric rate reductions from changes in policy may not lead to significant consumption 
increases rapidly. Alternatively, policy changes that lead to large electric rate increases 
will force household budgets to sacrifice consumption of other goods in their basket to 
continue their electricity consumption similar to current levels. In addition, this underlines 
the importance of the subsidy structure to minimize the distortion of market price signals 
as much as possible. It is critically important that as fuel oil prices and generation costs 
continue to increase over time leading to higher electric rates, that the PCE structure 
disincentives towards efficiency and innovation be removed or minimized so that 
residents are better able to cope with increasing price of inputs and better able to pursue 
alternative and more cost effective sources of electricity generation. The following 
chapter presents a preliminary effort to show how the PCE subsidy may continue to 
provide need economic assistance in PCE communities while minimizing distortions of 
market signals.
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Chapter 6 Aligning PCE and REF 
Alternative PCE formula
It is imperative that the current PCE formula be revised to eliminate or reduce the energy 
efficiency and renewable energy disincentives created by the current PCE funding 
formula.
International energy subsidy reform guidelines published by the United Nations in which 
it states that "a good subsidy is one that enhances access to sustainable modern energy 
or has a positive impact on the environment, while sustaining incentives for efficiency 
delivery and consumption” (UNEP, 2008). These guidelines suggest basic principles 
needed in implementing reforms to existing programs. Namely, a subsidy should be well- 
targeted, efficient, practical, and transparent among other features.
When analyzing alternative funding formulas and comparing them to the current PCE 
funding formula, the following parameters are key to evaluate whether the alternatives 
are improvements over the current system:
S Improves market signals
S Does not penalize increased energy efficiency or integration of renewable energy 
S Has an equitable distribution across households 
S Does not decrease the current distribution of funds to a community 
S Simplifies administration for utilities and state agencies and enhances 
understanding by customers/rate payers 
S Simplifies formula and information needs for implementation 
Previous research illustrates the impacts different types of economic assistance 
structures have on incentives. In 1987, an important conceptual review of potential 
structures of the PCE program was completed for the Governor’s Energy Policy Task 
Force (Mitchell 1987). In this review, Mitchell analyzed and ranked various program 
structures and funding formulas with respect to maintaining utility and customer market 
signals and economic incentives (Table 20). This research evaluated incentive effects of 
a subsidy program by analyzing what proportion of electricity generation cost savings 
are kept by the utility under various program structures (Table 20, Utility Incentive). 
Customer incentives were evaluated by analyzing the proportion of cost reductions from
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energy conservation measures kept by the customer (Table 20, Customer Incentive). 
According to Mitchell’s research under a Fixed Payment Formula utilities are able to 
keep 100% of the benefit from generation cost savings, and customers are able to keep 
100% of the benefits from savings through energy conservation measures they 
implement. This research extends Mitchell’s analysis by defining a specific formula.
Table 20. Summary o f incentive effects
Utility Customer
Program
Incentive Incentive
PCE Rate [current] 13% 33%
PCE Formula Rate 100%
significantly less 
than 33%
Shared Savings Rate 58% less than 33%
Baseline Rate 58% 75%
Postage Stamp Rate 8% 33%
Fixed Payment Formula 100% 100%
Fixed Payment Cost 58% 100%
Fixed Payment Formula - No Excess 100% 75%
Source: Table recreated from The Effect of Electricity Subsidy Programs on the Economic Incentives for 
Improving Generation and End-Use Technologies, A comparison of Power Cost Equalization and 
Alternatives; prepared for the Governor’s Energy Policy Task Force, Alan Mitchell, 1987.
The current PCE program uses a rate/cost formula to calculate PCE reimbursement 
rates. The key variables in the current PCE formula for calculating rates are non-fuel 
costs, fuel prices and consumption. Under a formula rate program, the calculated rate is 
then applied to the eligible amount of kilowatt-hours to determine the PCE payment.
The PCE program focuses on factors of the variable cost of power resulting in a program 
that it is clearly unsustainable given the continued increase of fuel costs. Since the year 
2000 fuel prices have increased by 10% annually; from 2000 to 2010 fuel prices 
increase a staggering 132% (see Figure 1 in Chapter 1). Hence cost of generating 
electricity in rural communities is increasing rapidly. In order to provide economic 
assistance at the same share it currently does, funding for the PCE program would need 
to constantly increase; however this is fiscally implausible. On the other hand if program 
funding does not increase or does not increase as fast as needed, increases in the 
effective rate residential customers pay is inevitable. Yet as presented in the previous
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chapter (Chapter 5) price elasticity for electricity of PCE residential consumers is highly 
inelastic. Consequently, the potential inability of the State to continue to fund the 
program, or efforts to seek program savings, would translate into substantial costs shift 
to the residential customers and/or utilities thereby exacerbating the access to electricity 
problem the program is trying to address. The costs shift is transferred almost entirely to 
the residential customer. For example, assume that the PCE program cannot sustain the 
necessary funding growth or that program savings are achieved through funding 
reductions, if the community of St. Mary’s (Table 19, Chapter 5) effective rate increases 
by 10% (from $0.311/kWh to $0.3421/kWh), their consumption will increase only by one 
kWh (from 383 kWh/month to 384 kWh/month). However, their monthly bill would 
increase by $12.25 or 9.3% in effect becoming the bearer of the cost.
It is for these reasons that it is essential that policy focuses on addressing the issues 
regarding cost of production and targets its support to capital investments that lower the 
cost of generation rather than variable costs. The REF program is an example of how 
the State has attempted to provide such support to utilities. By modifying the PCE Level 
formula such that the disincentives and uncertainty of pursuing alternative and cost 
effective sources of electricity generation be removed, the PCE program and the REF 
program could be aligned and achieve both the goal of providing economic assistance to 
rural consumers and pursue innovation and alternative solutions that can alleviate the 
challenge of providing electricity in rural communities.
Such an alternative may be a Fixed Payment formula which provides a payment per 
given time period independent of rates and consumption. The fixed payment, however, 
can vary by community and be determined based on the differences in prices customers 
pay or the cost of producing electricity.
Seasonal Fixed Payment Formula
A potential alternate PCE Fixed Payment formula structure can have the effect of 
removing the disincentives found in the current PCE formula. One example of a formula 
design may be a fixed payment formula based on the per gallon price of fuel in a 
community, a generation efficiency rate, and the mean seasonal household monthly 
kWh consumption level. A fixed payment is calculated by dividing the price per gallon of 
fuel oil in a particular community (regardless of whether they generate their power with
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fuel oil or other sources; fuel price is used as a proxy to measure how much more costly 
it is to generate in one village compared to others) by a fixed generation efficiency of 14 
kWh per gallon. This factor is then multiplied by the seasonal mean monthly residential 
consumption.
[(Fuel price $/gallon) *  (kWh/gal)] ‘ Average m onthly consumption per season 
Figure 18: Seasonal Fixed Payment Formula.
The resulting fixed payment would be applied to the rate payer’s bill every month and 
paid to the utility. However, to accommodate changes in seasonal consumption needs, 
the fixed payment would change by season so that during the summer months (April- 
September) the customer receives a lower fixed payment reflecting lower seasonal 
consumption levels, and in the winter months (October-March) the fixed payment would 
be higher reflecting higher winter consumption (about 11% according to the model 
presented in Chapter 5).
Because the payment does not depend on the amount of fuel consumed and the 
customer receives payment regardless of consumption or rates, household and 
generation energy efficiency and renewable energy incentives are reestablished. If the 
utility is able to produce energy at lower cost through gains in demand or supply side 
efficiency or using renewable energy, the benefits to the utility and customer increases. 
This formula structure is particularly simple and significantly decreases the 
administrative burden rural utilities face to file for PCE payments with the RCA and AEA. 
Because of its simplicity, the administration of the program could potentially be given to 
a single agency resulting in lower administrative costs to the state.29 
An important feature of this potential Seasonal Fixed Payment formula is that if the 
customer has an electric bill lower than the fixed payment, the balance could be carried 
over to future months as a credit. At the end of the year if the customer has a net credit, 
there are a number of options that the program could offer to customers. For example, 
the customer could use the credit to purchase more energy efficient appliances and/or
29
Additional research is needed to estimate and analyzed the amount and areas where savings 
can occur.
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lighting products, transfer the credit to a relative in the village who may need it, or simply 
carry it forward to the following year.
Efforts should be made to improve the PCE formula design with this type of fixed 
payment structure and to ensure efforts to address the energy challenges in rural Alaska 
are coordinated. A formula of this structure may be implemented in a way that total 
residential disbursements remain similar to the current PCE funding formula. However, it 
is inevitable that effective rates at the community and customer level may change.
In order to accurately analyze potential policy and/or programmatic changes such as the 
one described reliable estimates of price and income elasticities are necessary. The 
findings presented in this research provide a formalized measure of price and income 
elasticities that expands the current knowledge base regarding the electricity market in 
PCE communities. These findings can be of value to researchers and policy makers as 
they analyzed potential policy reforms and programmatic changes.
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Chapter 7 Policy Considerations 
Coordinating State Policy and Programs
The PCE program is critical to many rural residents; restructuring the program to 
improve its effectiveness and efficiency is complex. There are no simple solutions to 
addressing the problems of high costs that rural utilities and residents face. In seeking 
solutions to these issues, it is important to approach the PCE program in the context of 
total energy use in rural Alaska. The PCE program alone has not and will not solve the 
fundamental issues that result in high cost energy and the impacts this has on rural 
residents.
Most PCE communities depend on fuel oil for both electricity generation and space 
heating. Consequently, high fuel oil prices increase both the cost of electricity and space 
heating, thus magnifying the pressure on households. Space heating is a larger share of 
household energy expenses (40%) than electricity, followed by transportation (33%), 
Figure 19, (Colt, 2011). PCE provides important relief on electricity rates; however only 
about 27% of fuel consumed in PCE communities is used to produce electricity (Figure 
19). In addition, only about 30% of kWh used in eligible communities is affected by PCE 
effective rates—so the PCE program only touches about 10% of the energy picture in 
rural Alaska.
Figure 19: Energy use in surveyed PCE communities by category. Source: Energy Use the Big
Efficiency Picture. Presentation at the Alaska Rural Energy Conference by Steve Colt (2011), ISER.
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This composition of energy use is reflected in the course of this and other rural energy 
research which we found a high level of "energy insecurity” expressed by rural residents. 
Given volatile and unpredictable energy prices and past changes in legislative funding of 
the PCE program, many residents are understandably concerned about the ability to 
stay warm, gather subsistence resources and keep the lights on. Reviewing and 
improving rural energy programs must be done from a "whole village energy” 
perspective.
From a whole village perspective, one of the first objectives is to assist rural residents to 
be as energy efficient as possible to reduce the impacts of energy price volatility while 
maintaining or improving quality of life and reducing anxiety over energy security. In 
addition to the current on-going weatherization efforts in rural communities, energy 
efficiency and conservation could be maximized to fulfill this objective. This does not 
mean that new efficiency and conservation programs are needed but instead existing 
programs can be better coordinated and delivered—when a home or building is 
weatherized, it can also be retrofitted to improve electrical efficiency. Commercial and 
public building can be weatherized and electrical energy efficiency measures installed 
simultaneously with residential housing weatherization and rebate programs.
A recent weatherization and electrical retrofit on 13 community buildings and four 
teacher housing units in Nightmute was done as a concurrent effort. This more 
comprehensive and integrated effort resulted in estimated annual electric power savings 
of 59% and thermal energy savings 56% (Butler 2010). It is likely residential buildings 
experience similar savings and whole village efforts could produce substantial energy 
saving for residents, public buildings, businesses and schools. Realizing these 
substantial demand side efficiency gains is a first step to solving the challenge of high 
rural energy costs for residents. It logically proceeds addressing supply side generation, 
either fossil fuel, renewable or disaggregated, because the generation capacity would be 
inappropriately sized for the demand and continue to overcapitalize generation resulting 
in generation inefficiencies. These actions could take place in concert with the 
assistance that a re-formulated PCE program can provide.
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Centralized versus Disaggregated Generation
Power Cost Equalization eligibility depends on having a centralized utility. As a result, for 
some of the smallest communities there is an incentive to over capitalize electricity 
generation despite the potential for less capital intensive solutions. Institutional 
mechanisms that emphasize conventional solutions "...raises the propensity to ignore 
decentralized supply options” (Hourcade & Colombier, 1990). For communities with very 
small populations, a traditional centralized utility may translate to higher cost power as 
compared to disaggregated generation because of the added cost of administration, 
transmission lines, and building necessary redundancy into the system among other 
costs that could potentially be avoided through disaggregated generation, though each 
individual household may experience differing degrees of reliability and access to power. 
If economic assistance for electricity was not restricted to centralized utilities, villages 
could organize through their local tribes or government to create mechanisms to support 
current or alternative ways of disaggregated generation that may be less costly to 
operate. It may also result in job creation that can be more compatible with the 
subsistence life styles of many rural residents and potentially more sustainable in the 
long run. Further research is necessary to determine the population size and other 
circumstances at which a rural village may be able to access lower cost electricity 
through disaggregated self- generation rather than opting to run a centralized utility.
Conclusions
Price and consumption patterns in rural communities participating in the PCE program 
are considerably different and span over a wide range. These differences are a reflection 
of access to resources and infrastructure and their opportunity to have gains in 
economies of scale. Generally, these communities pay much higher prices and consume 
far less than urban communities in Alaska.
The PCE program was created over 25 years to provide economic assistance to rural 
customers facing high electricity prices. Although the program has been relatively 
effective in lowering prices closer to urban prices, the financial sustainability of the 
program its fragile and it’s reflected by in the number of years the State has not been 
able to fully fund the program and having to resort to pro-rating the subsidy. In addition,
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its funding structure has important implications on incentives for rural 
utilities/communities to pursue alternative sources of electricity generation that may be 
more cost effective. When integrating alternative sources, due to the way fuel costs are 
accounted for in the formula may lead to increase in the residential effective rate even if 
the alternative resource may be more cost effective. Also, when savings are achieved, 
whether by gains in efficiency or by integration of alternative sources, most of the 
savings accrue to the program rather than to the residential customer thereby affecting 
customers’ incentives.
The PCE program effects on incentives on efficiency and integration of alternative 
sources has been accentuated since the State implemented the REF program which has 
the goal of incentivizing renewable energy development in Alaska. Many rural 
communities have received grants through the REF program for projects integrating 
renewable energy into their electricity generation system; in rural Alaska wind 
development has experience rapid growth since the establishment of the REF program.
It is important that state programs have congruent goals and incentives not only because 
of fiduciary responsibility but also because having a coordinated approach to the 
complex challenges facing rural Alaska communities is critical.
Little is known about rural Alaska energy needs, consumption and prices. Lack of data 
availability and data quality necessary for rigorous analysis is a major barrier to insightful 
research and policy analysis. Although electricity consumption represents the smallest 
share of energy use in PCE communities, because of the PCE program there is 
relatively more information available regarding electricity consumption and prices. 
Nonetheless, no estimates of the price elasticity of demand in PCE communities have 
been previously done. Although the preliminary effort presented in this paper is 
imperfect, it provides insightful information and a base to improve elasticity estimates as 
additional and more disaggregated data becomes available.
Understanding electricity and energy demand in PCE communities is critically important 
when evaluating potential program reforms and to help find better alternatives to address 
challenges faced in rural communities. It is also vital to policy analysis and aims to 
evaluate existing programs so that programs can be better coordinated and potentially 
create synergies that help address energy challenges rural communities face.
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Appendix A: PCE Program Funding Levels over Time
PCE Funding Level Detail
Fiscal Average Annual PCE PCE No. o f PCE No. o f PCE No. o f PCE No. o f
Program Year Funding Level Level Months Level Months Level Months Level Months
PPCA 1981 100% 100% 12
PCA 1982 100% 100% 12
PCA 1983 100% 100% 12
PCA 1984 ; 100% 100% 12
PCA
______________  1985
PCE
100% 100% 12
PCE 1986 100% 100% 12
PCE 1987 100% 100% 12
PCE 1988 100% 100% 12
PCE 1989 100% 100% 12
PCE 1990 100% 100% 12
PCE 1991 100% 100% 12
PCE 1992 82% 100% 1 80% 11
PCE 1993 89% ; 80% 1 90% 11
PCE 1994 ; 95% ; 90% 2 95% 8 100% 2
PCE 1995 98% : 100% 10 85% 2
PCE 1996 98% j  85% 2 100% 10
PCE 1997 85% | 85% 12
PCE 1998 85% j  85% 12
PCE 1999 83% j  85% 10 74% 2
PCE 2000 100% 1  1 0 0 % 12
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PCE Funding Level Detail
Program
Fiscal
Year
Average Annual PCE 
Funding Level
PCE
Level
No. o f 
Months
PCE
Level
No. o f 
Months
PCE
Level
No. o f 
Months
PCE
Level
No. o f 
Months
PCE 2001 98% 100% 11 74% 1
PCE 2002 80% 92% 7 80% 4 66% 1
PCE 2003 86% 84% 8 90% 3 92% 1
PCE 2004 82% 92% 3 83% 6 75% 2 63% 1
PCE 2005 72% 81% 2 76% 5 65% 4 63% 1
PCE 2006 88% 81% 4 78% 3 100% 5
PCE 2007 95% 100% 6 89% 6
PCE 2008 100% 100% 12
PCE 2009 100% 100% 12
PCE 2010 100% 100% 12
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Appendix B. PCE Appropriations and Disbursements over Time
Program Fiscal Year Appropriations Total Disbursements
($) ($)
PPCA 1981 2,657,600 2,183,168
PCA 1982 9,300,000 6,419,408
PCA 1983 8,300,000 8,327,152
PCA 1984 8,300,000 8,740,820
PCA/PCE 1985 19,100,000 13,800,868
PCE 1986 21,700,000 17,785,390
PCE 1987 13,840,299 16,771,338
PCE 1988 15,067,900 17,018,680
PCE 1989 19,724,000 17,104,631
PCE 1990 16,814,000 17,785,256
PCE 1991 16,912,100 19,607,435
PCE 1992 15,029,700 15,731,165
PCE 1993 18,026,700 17,341,042
PCE 1994 17,920,000 17,516,024
PCE 1995 18,635,000 18,493,448
PCE 1996 19,385,600 19,201,515
PCE 1997 18,500,000 17,906,275
PCE 1998 18,700,000 18,503,992
PCE 1999 18,050,000 17,949,524
PCE 2000 15,700,000 14,415,676
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Program Fiscal Year Appropriations Total Disbursements
($) ($)
PCE 2001 17,090,222 17,076,203
PCE 2002 15,700,000 15,469,105
PCE 2003 15,700,000 15,448,480
PCE 2004 15,700,000 15,617,225
PCE 2005 15,700,000 15,370,599
PCE 2006 22,020,000 21,494,137
PCE 2007 25,619,000 25,437,093
PCE 2008 28,560,000 28,137,549
PCE 2009 38,500,000 37,029,584
PCE 2010 37,660,000 30,627,339
PCE 2011
Appendix C. PCE communities characteristics of importance as factors of electricity production and demand30
Community
Name Census Region
Residential 
Rate 2010$ 
per kWh
Effective 
Rate 
2010$ per 
kWh
Fuel
Prices
2010$
per
gallon
kWh
per
gallon
Average
Residential
Monthly
Consumption
Population
Average
Household
Income,
2004
(2010$$)
Median
Income
(2004)*
2010$
Adak Aleutians West (CA) 0.73 0.23 3.55 5.47 258 105 2* 64,453*
Akiachak Bethel (CA) 0.64 0.24 3.72 15.05 306 624 4 41,459
Akiak Bethel (CA) 0.64 0.32 4.55 12.45 238 339 4 30,372
Akutan Aleutians East 0.33 0.14 3.22 8.89 394 812 2 39,049
Alakanuk Wade Hampton (CA) 0.63 0.20 3.90 13.55 417 695 5 30,483
Allakaket Yukon-Koyukuk (CA) 0.71 0.19 4.38 13.56 237 105 2* 23,824*
Ambler Northwest Arctic 0.76 0.21 4.47 14.13 398 258 4 50,330
Anaktuvuk
Pass North Slope 0.16 0.14 5.20 11.52 604 309 3 60,743
Angoon Hoonah-Angoon (CA) 0.48 0.20 2.78 14.08 412 450 3 34,550
Aniak Bethel (CA) 0.75 0.27 3.62 13.39 452 494 3 48,450
Anvik Yukon-Koyukuk (CA) 0.68 0.19 4.17 11.92 327 72 3 24,587
30 Income and household data are originally sourced from the Internal Revenue Service for the Viable Business Enterprises for Rural 
Alaska project by ISER and other partners (http://ced.uaa.alaska.edu/vibes/VIBESsummary.pdf) . The Income and household data 
represent calendar year of 2004 and adjusted to 2010 dollars. Although more recent data is available through the U.S. Census Bureau 
America Community Survey (ACS), we present older data because we believe it is more accurate. ACS data is available as a 5 year 
average and is the result extrapolation of sampled data. However, due to the challenges of small samples in Alaska, ACS tends to have 
very large margin of errors severely limiting its value. When data from the VIBES project was not available, ACS data is presented; this is 
indicated by the asterisks next to the data point. 83
Community Residential Effective Rate 
2010$ per 
kWh
Fuel
Prices kWh AverageResidential
Monthly
Consumption
Average
Household MedianIncome
(2004)*
2010$
Name Census Region Rate 2010$ 2010$ per Population Income,
per kWh per
gallon
gallon 2004
(2010$$)
Atka Aleutians West (CA) 0.71 0.24 4.19 10.79 395 63 3 35,796
Atmautluak Bethel (CA) 0.78 0.37 3.59 6.98 340 269 5 43,871
Atqasuk North Slope 0.19 0.18 3.00 8.39 783 212 4 77,065
Beaver Yukon-Koyukuk (CA) 0.56 0.14 3.80 195 73 3 33,264
Bethel Bethel (CA) 0.50 0.16 5.05 13.76 505 5,966 3 66,321
Betties Yukon-Koyukuk (CA) 0.62 0.19 2.65 12.13 382 13 3 57,128
Brevig
Mission Nome (CA) 0.60 0.19 4.00 14.21 418 358 4 25,310
Buckland Northwest Arctic 0.53 0.23 5.00 11.42 523 392 5 44,352
Central Yukon-Koyukuk (CA) 0.61 0.31 2.27 10.82 167 96 2* 14,278*
Chalky itsik Yukon-Koyukuk (CA) 0.97 0.59 4.18 10.59 123 71 2 18,801
Chefornak Bethel (CA) 0.64 0.26 4.13 12.95 424 430 5 41,139
Chenega
Bay Valdez-Cordova (CA) 0.47 0.17 3.30 6.64 343 80 4 62,190
Chevak Wade Hampton (CA) 0.66 0.19 4.03 12.87 430 931 5 31,095
Chignik Lake and Peninsula 0.52 0.18 2.75 11.34 286 84 3 39,628
Chignik
Lagoon Lake and Peninsula 0.45 0.15 3.93 11.60 428 82 3 106,789
Chignik Lake Lake and Peninsula 0.59 0.19 2.80 316 77 4 47,967
Chilkat
Valley Haines 0.48 0.20 3.20 292 43,855*
17
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Community
Name Census Region
Residential 
Rate 2010$ 
per kWh
Effective 
Rate 
2010$ per 
kWh
Fuel
Prices
2010$
per
gallon
kWh
per
gallon
Average
Residential
Monthly
Consumption
Population
Average
Household
Income,
2004
(2010$$)
Median
Income
(2004)*
2010$
Chistochina Valdez-Cordova (CA) 0.52 0.19 2.31 11.50 292 93 2* 47,040*
Chitina Valdez-Cordova (CA) 0.55 0.25 2.73 13.25 277 133 2* 12,763*
Chuathbaluk Bethel (CA) 1.01 0.26 5.15 11.53 217 107 4 39,669
Circle Yukon-Koyukuk (CA) 0.68 0.19 2.43 10.63 300 115 2* 15,060*
Coffman
Cove
Prince of Wales-Hyder 
(CA) 0.43 0.18 2.51 13.31 306 207 3 50,619
Cold Bay Aleutians East 0.63 0.18 3.65 13.54 405 110 2 64,504
Cordova Valdez-Cordova (CA) 0.34 0.24 2.23 13.40 517 2,266 2 57,983
Craig
Prince of Wales-Hyder 
(CA) 0.21 0.16 2.30 10.36 504 1,194 3 52,410
Crooked
Creek Bethel (CA) 1.01 0.26 5.25 11.77 282 106 4 20,248
Deering Northwest Arctic 0.78 0.35 4.71 12.64 381 126 3 38,567
Dillingham Dillingham (CA) 0.44 0.16 3.60 15.20 475 2,245 3 59,538
Diomede Nome (CA) 0.61 0.14 5.85 9.88 258 118 3 27,479
Dot Lake
Southeast Fairbanks 
(CA) 0.33 0.17 2.08 344 8 1* 38,461*
Eagle
Southeast Fairbanks 
(CA) 0.63 0.19 2.88 12.30 209 82 2* 25,047*
Eek Bethel (CA) 0.69 0.20 3.83 12.03 269 283 4 20,248
Egegik Lake and Peninsula 0.93 0.36 4.30 9.62 265 73 3 53,223
Ekwok Dillingham (CA) 0.51 0.14 3.70 338 117 3 18,801
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Elfin Cove Hoonah-Angoon (CA) 0.57 0.18 4.42 12.86 182 23 2 39,049
Elim Nome (CA) 0.61 0.19 4.07 13.67 393 302 4 46,488
Emmonak Wade Hampton (CA) 0.64 0.20 3.90 13.51 442 766 4 38,085
Fort Yukon Yukon-Koyukuk (CA) 0.61 0.22 3.78 14.12 275 604 3 33,987
Galena Yukon-Koyukuk (CA) 0.57 0.23 4.30 13.03 365 539 3 70,722
Gambell Nome (CA) 0.62 0.19 3.93 13.38 370 680 4 36,397
Golovin Nome (CA) 0.71 0.19 5.10 12.23 319 154 3 36,880
Goodnews
Bay Bethel (CA) 0.64 0.20 3.83 12.91 352 247 3 18,801
Grayling Yukon-Koyukuk (CA) 0.71 0.21 4.17 11.83 294 182 4 25,310
Gustavus Hoonah-Angoon (CA) 0.58 0.28 2.71 15.47 159 464 2 40,225
Haines Haines 0.21 0.15 3.13 13.24 450 1,673 2* 44,877*
Healy Lake
Southeast Fairbanks
(CA) 0.66 0.24 2.53 9.43 269 8 2*
11,2953
*
Hollis
Prince of Wales-Hyder 
(CA) 0.21 0.16 2.80 401 118 2* 27,866*
Holy Cross Yukon-Koyukuk (CA) 0.68 0.19 4.10 12.63 322 186 4 25,310
Hoonah Hoonah-Angoon (CA) 0.48 0.20 2.40 14.27 424 762 3 45,156
Hooper Bay Wade Hampton (CA) 0.62 0.19 4.00 13.53 338 1,054 4 30,854
98
Community Residential Effective Rate 
2010$ per 
kWh
Fuel
Prices kWh AverageResidential
Monthly
Consumption
Average
Household MedianIncome
(2004)*
2010$
Name Census Region Rate 2010$ 2010$ per Population Income,
per kWh per
gallon
gallon 2004
(2010$$)
Hughes Yukon-Koyukuk (CA) 0.72 0.34 4.45 12.76 291 71 3 28,202
Huslia Yukon-Koyukuk (CA) 0.64 0.20 4.13 403 267 3 31,239
Hydaburg
Prince of Wales-Hyder 
(CA) 0.21 0.16 2.88 (3.84) 505 386 3 36,591
Igiugig Lake and Peninsula 0.75 0.17 6.33 10.65 314 39 3 25,165
Kake Petersburg (CA) 0.48 0.20 2.71 13.34 374 578 3 45,868
Kaktovik North Slope 0.18 0.16 3.70 15.78 662 245 3 64,359
Kalskag Bethel (CA) 0.60 0.19 3.97 13.42 396 196 4 32,782
Kaltag Yukon-Koyukuk (CA) 0.64 0.19 4.03 14.23 338 187 3 33,747
Karluk Kodiak Island 0.61 0.14 3.58 11.55 470 38 3 22,176
Kasigluk Bethel (CA) 0.55 0.18 3.97 13.53 452 548 5 36,446
Kiana Northwest Arctic 0.69 0.19 4.40 12.75 423 356 4 45,920
King Cove Aleutians East 0.25 0.15 2.36 11.13 425 824 3 53,099
Kipnuk Bethel (CA) 0.65 0.26 3.65 6.37 416 640 5 39,772
Kivalina Northwest Arctic 0.71 0.20 4.40 12.78 497 370 5 35,674
Klawock
Prince of Wales-Hyder 
(CA) 0.21 0.16 2.85 520 723 3 40,496
Klukwan Hoonah-Angoon (CA) 0.48 0.20 3.20 390 76 2* 27,760*
Kobuk Northwest Arctic 0.88 0.30 422 133 4 35,578
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Kokhanok Lake and Peninsula 0.92 0.27 4.57 12.15 337 170 3 22,658
Koliganek Dillingham (CA) 0.51 0.14 5.06 8.36 273 185 3 51,583
Kongiganak Bethel (CA) 0.56 0.26 4.03 12.72 452 440 5 38,471
Kotlik Wade Hampton (CA) 0.59 0.19 3.67 13.57 455 574 5 43,677
Kotzebue Northwest Arctic 0.48 0.18 3.94 15.16 650 3,331 3 66,138
Koyuk Nome (CA) 0.63 0.19 4.07 13.85 471 338 4 35,193
Koyukuk Yukon-Koyukuk (CA) 0.46 0.15 4.00 181 99 3 22,417
Kwethluk Bethel (CA) 0.53 0.24 3.73 12.44 292 692 5 29,408
Kwigillingok Bethel (CA) 0.51 0.17 3.90 13.23 446 330 5 41,942
Larsen Bay Kodiak Island 0.41 0.22 3.59 11.56 301 85 3 47,244
Levelock Lake and Peninsula 0.72 0.13 8.50 190 95 3 21,694
Lime Village Bethel (CA) 1.27 0.67 8.20 5.62 82 24 1* 14,039*
Lower
Kalskag Bethel (CA) 0.60 0.19 3.97 299 271 4 29,648
Manley Hot 
Springs Yukon-Koyukuk (CA) 1.05 0.27 2.38 10.83 122 85 4* 76,260*
Manokotak Dillingham (CA) 0.51 0.19 3.88 12.31 334 422 4 31,095
Marshall Wade Hampton (CA) 0.64 0.20 3.57 14.27 433 396 4 38,085
McGrath Yukon-Koyukuk (CA) 0.61 0.17 3.82 13.19 363 327 3 49,816
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Mekoryuk Bethel (CA) 0.66 0.19 3.70 13.08 270 177 3 35,674
Mentasta
Lake Valdez-Cordova (CA) 0.53 0.19 2.33 12.35 274 122 3* 22,335*
Minto Yukon-Koyukuk (CA) 0.59 0.20 3.47 12.67 327 203 3* 32,227*
Mountain
Village Wade Hampton (CA) 0.61 0.20 3.93 14.63 428 806 4 36,157
Naknek Bristol Bay 0.44 0.17 3.50 15.15 397 545 3 61,776
Napakiak Bethel (CA) 0.98 0.25 2.69 307 345 4 33,264
Napaskiak Bethel (CA) 0.61 0.18 3.76 8.44 448 410 5 36,800
Naukati Bay
Prince of Wales-Hyder 
(CA) 0.45 0.18 2.55 12.27 404 111 2 31,818
Nelson
Lagoon Aleutians East 0.66 0.27 4.32 11.98 304 58 3 50,619
New
Stuyahok Dillingham (CA) 0.63 0.19 4.13 12.79 430 510 4 30,131
Newtok Bethel (CA) 0.81 0.40 4.68 10.25 308 351 5 37,242
Nightmute Bethel (CA) 0.55 0.18 4.03 447 279 4 41,581
Nikolai Yukon-Koyukuk (CA) 0.81 0.42 4.83 3.19 359 86 3 17,355
Nikolski Aleutians West (CA) 0.61 0.22 4.50 9.72 338 23 3 44,834
Noatak Northwest Arctic 0.81 0.19 6.70 13.86 561 490 4 35,674
Nome Nome (CA) 0.38 0.20 3.80 15.91 458 3,610 3 68,729
Nondalton Lake and Peninsula 0.59 0.28 4.75 11.34 394 162 3 22,658
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Noorvik Northwest Arctic 0.70 0.20 4.47 11.74 525 619 5 60,123
Northway
Southeast Fairbanks 
(CA) 0.49 0.18 2.25 13.66 320 84 3* 36,109*
Nuiqsut North Slope 0.17 0.11 3.50 11.90 640 410 4 55,578
Nulato Yukon-Koyukuk (CA) 0.63 0.19 3.93 13.72 348 249 4 29,057
Nunam Iqua Wade Hampton (CA) 0.54 0.25 3.85 13.15 344 183 5 33,553
Nunapitchuk Bethel (CA) 0.55 0.18 3.97 395 483 4 33,884
Old Harbor Kodiak Island 0.61 0.19 3.77 13.33 304 219 3 37,603
Ouzinkie Kodiak Island 0.40 0.21 3.33 14.06 318 169 3 60,743
Pedro Bay Lake and Peninsula 0.93 0.49 4.65 12.20 289 62 3 42,520
Pelican Hoonah-Angoon (CA) 0.44 0.16 3.32 12.29 402 112 2 56,404
Perryville Lake and Peninsula 0.58 0.43 3.00 300 130 3 60,020
Pilot Point Lake and Peninsula 0.51 0.14 4.77 12.82 345 74 3 47,727
Pilot Station Wade Hampton (CA) 0.63 0.19 3.80 12.66 423 544 5 35,950
Pitkas Point Wade Hampton (CA) 0.62 0.18 3.50 297 92 4 48,450
Point Hope North Slope 0.18 0.17 3.70 14.99 796 660 4 73,037
Point Lay North Slope 0.16 0.15 3.55 13.24 683 196 4 79,545
Port Alsworth Lake and Peninsula 0.66 0.19 4.16 11.80 335 129 3 67,975
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Port Heiden Lake and Peninsula 0.69 0.36 4.34 283 99 3 36,880
Quinhagak Bethel (CA) 0.65 0.20 3.90 13.78 363 680 4 29,106
Red Devil Bethel (CA) 1.01 0.26 5.25 8.12 235 33 3 12,655
Ruby Yukon-Koyukuk (CA) 0.92 0.58 4.01 4.60 131 162 3 28,202
Russian
Mission Wade Hampton (CA) 0.63 0.20 3.90 13.87 480 314 4 31,818
Saint Marys Wade Hampton (CA) 0.62 0.18 3.50 14.02 349 548 4 45,557
Saint
Michael Nome (CA) 0.62 0.20 4.00 14.68 532 407 4 38,223
Saint Paul Aleutians West (CA) 0.48 0.23 3.63 14.12 537 439 3 58,718
Sand Point Aleutians East 0.49 0.21 3.29 13.99 457 1,051 3 64,118
Savoonga Nome (CA) 0.59 0.20 3.93 14.20 469 660 4 27,118
Scammon
Bay Wade Hampton (CA) 0.63 0.19 3.90 13.48 439 474 5 29,648
Selawik Northwest Arctic 0.66 0.19 4.47 13.54 475 825 4 29,648
Shageluk Yukon-Koyukuk (CA) 0.75 0.20 4.00 11.32 252 91 4 30,854
Shaktoolik Nome (CA) 0.61 0.19 3.93 13.81 517 245 4 36,880
Shishmaref Nome (CA) 0.60 0.18 4.07 14.48 412 559 4 35,537
Shungnak Northwest Arctic 0.71 0.20 4.47 13.51 533 260 5 51,343
Skagway Skagway 0.21 0.15 1.93 14.39 467 881 3* 72,795*
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Slana Valdez-Cordova (CA) 0.53 0.19 2.36 12.86 281 141 3* 46,106*
Sleetmute Bethel (CA) 1.01 0.26 5.25 10.54 245 77 3 17,355
Stebbins Nome (CA) 0.62 0.19 3.90 13.29 347 574 4 26,756
Stevens
Village Yukon-Koyukuk (CA) 1.10 0.63 5.20 10.99 102 86 3* 42,713*
Stony River Bethel (CA) 1.01 0.26 5.30 9.64 145 47 2* 11,486*
Takotna Yukon-Koyukuk (CA) 1.15 0.41 5.08 9.54 204 55 3 16,873
Tanana Yukon-Koyukuk (CA) 0.74 0.26 3.38 13.42 227 242 3 34,421
Tatitlek Valdez-Cordova (CA) 0.67 0.42 3.10 9.93 302 92 3 42,665
Teller Nome (CA) 0.71 0.20 4.43 11.35 325 253 4 26,611
Tenakee
Springs Hoonah-Angoon (CA) 0.64 0.30 3.58 12.80 166 129 2 38,326
Tetlin
Southeast Fairbanks 
(CA) 0.33 0.17 2.11 334 126 4* 42,544*
Thorne Bay
Prince of Wales-Hyder 
(CA) 0.21 0.16 2.85 13.41 402 442 3 52,789
Togiak Dillingham (CA) 0.61 0.18 3.90 13.16 410 808 4 27,742
Tok
Southeast Fairbanks 
(CA) 0.33 0.17 2.22 14.12 469 1,218 3* 55,122*
Toksook Bay Bethel (CA) 0.55 0.18 4.03 14.45 446 601 5 34,951
Tuluksak Bethel (CA) 0.61 0.24 4.38 13.20 244 365 5 36,519
Tuntutuliak Bethel (CA) 0.65 0.26 3.60 13.50 357 380 4 29,504
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Tununak Bethel (CA) 0.55 0.18 4.03 388 318 4 28,925
Twin Hills Dillingham (CA) 0.56 0.16 5.73 7.44 328 78 3 33,987
Unalakleet Nome (CA) 0.48 0.19 3.61 13.48 444 685 3 48,691
Unalaska Aleutians West (CA) 0.33 0.24 2.04 13.70 483 4,092 3 80,458
Wainwright North Slope 0.17 0.15 4.40 12.43 644 536 4 63,314
Wales Nome (CA) 0.67 0.19 4.07 12.56 362 153 3 38,567
Whale Pass
Prince of Wales-Hyder 
(CA) 0.47 0.21 2.14 12.34 208 37 2* 43,714*
White
Mountain Nome (CA) 0.92 0.50 3.01 9.57 296 209 3 29,889
Yakutat Yakutat 0.46 0.24 3.10 13.38 446 742 3 54,132
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